Reconciliation

To frame the proposal, I will start by delimiting the context to appreciate the benefits or potential it has to foster reconciliation, or at least discourage the renewal of violence cycles. In the case of responsibility as an alternative to promote and reinforce recognition of conflict’s actors such as victimizers, and as an attempt to engage citizens in the transition and peacebuilding process during post-conflict, lies an inescapable call to expose reconciliation and the debates around it.

Reconciliation is a complex concept because it varies depending on the factors considered for its understanding. The authors Rettberg and Ugarriza (2016) propose seven dimensions under which reconciliation is understood, namely: perspectives —religious, historical, etc.—; axis —horizontal - spatial, vertical – temporal—; levels —national, intergroup, etc.—; contexts —postwar, post-conflict, etc.—; depth —supplements such as recognition, tolerance, coexistence, etc.—; mechanisms —requirements or minimums such as forgiveness, trust, memory, peace, regret, etc.—; and evaluation —such as hope, skepticism or pessimism— (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016, p. 521). These dimensions pose a framework for empirical analysis, but in turn, they also serve to expose the differences between the multiple understandings of reconciliation and respective readings. Consequently, these vary according to the discipline the authors come from, the focus and case particularities, and also answer to temporal scopes of the concept analysis.

In general terms, the way reconciliation has been understood in countries with armed conflict history, post-conflict, or post-war processes, usually varies. Since in all cases this definition has been a political commitment to what has happened in each country, subject to society’s particular reaction. Cases such as South Africa, Northern Ireland and Argentina show that the word reconciliation is perceived in very different ways (Baloyi, 2018; Jelin, 2002; Little, 2012; Sooka 2006; Tropp et al., 2017; Vaisman & Barrera, 2020). In fact, for many people, this concept refers to a political moment rather than a social process. Moreover, in the exercise developed by Little (2012), it is evident that there are occasions when talking about reconciliation constitutes a conflict in itself, specifically, in scenarios in which the opposing parties, under their logic Us v. Them, call themselves victims.

Thus, the decision to grant recognition to victims in favor of reconciliation becomes problematic and politically strategic for some administrations depending on political parties’ —or leaders’— interests. Since, beyond giving true meaning to the concept to ensure the process’ success, there are actors with decision-making power that use central categories and post-conflict concepts as discursive tools to promote ideologies or political projects to support specific social structures or power hierarchies. For example, the campaign and victory of “No” during the Plebiscite of the Peace Agreement in Colombia (Suárez & Lizama-Mué, 2021) or, the victory of the Yes campaign in Chile.

The difficulty within the discussion about reconciliation emanates, primarily, from the frequency in which different actors label different types of activities as synonyms, or conducive, to reconciliation (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016, p. 518). This makes the concept and its apprehension even more heterogeneous. Conversely, it ends up being difficult to achieve the desired “peace”, since different interpretations made by a variety of actors, societies, and policymakers who have a specific set of beliefs, interests, and power, make it more challenging. An example of the previous statement is the case where certain sectors of society, or groups, link reconciliation —and by default peace- with forgiveness, and forgiveness with a religion; making it much more chaotic and challenging to find consensus, at the same time it allows binary positions to stand out and reproduce Us V. Them logics. Moreover, when a variety of definitions surface creating multiple vectors of unequal forces going in different directions, that disseminates the general peace-building efforts where the general good of the world is at the center, as aforementioned was developed when reviewing responsibility.

It is worthwhile to frame the preceding interest in armed, ethnic and genocide conflicts after the events of Cambodia, former Yugoslavia —Bosnia and Herzegovina— and Rwanda at the end of the Twentieth Century. As well as the growing interest of organizations such as the United Nations to take effective action in cases of massive human rights violations. For example, the special report “The Agenda for Peace” from the then Secretary-General Boutros - Ghali in 1992, the studies of Theo van Boven in 1993 and its guidelines from 1996 and 1997, and Louis Joinet’s guidelines in 1997 – all of them related to armed conflicts and victim’s rights. In this context, studies on reconciliation began to take hold, especially since the Truth Commission of South Africa in the mid-1990s (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016). Interest in this new exercise impacted the scientific community, leading it to increase written production referring to research for peace and post-conflict from different disciplines and areas of knowledge. Which led to higher today’s standards for what is acceptable in terms of transitional justice processes around justice, truth, reparation and non-repetition, as well as for the strengthening of victim’s rights legal frameworks.

The academic debate around the concepts arose from not only interest but also the eagerness to act in these contexts, which are as diverse as the types of conflicts —ethnic, religious, cultural, guerrillas, dictatorships, resources... or a combination of them—. In several conflicts, differences between definitions and concepts surrounding “reconciliation” are nested for procuring fidelity to the contexts for which they are formulated. With regards to the variety of formulations Sartori (1970) proposes the elaboration of a careful definition of the relationship between the concepts in question and others that are broader and more abstract, as well as those that are more specific. While, on the other hand, authors such as Gerring and Barresi (2003) suggest a differentiation between minimal definitions - which capture the essence of the concepts and apply to a greater number of cases - and, maximum definitions, which describe the types of cases and their attributes in more detail (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016, p. 519). Which demonstrates different possibilities for “evaluating" one definition or another, as well as how many interpretations are available.

In the study conducted by Rettberg and Ugarriza (2016), the authors find five common approaches to the concept of reconciliation after examining 162 scientific articles, books and reports published between 1997 and 2014, namely: as a rhetorical resource without any definite meaning; as a synonym for some term “neighbor” such as peace, harmony, etc.; multivocal term, with authors refrain from using an existing definition previously used by others; as a goal, where reconciliation is described as the endpoint of every peacebuilding effort; and as a process that does not necessarily lead to a concrete result (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016, p. 520). This is also due to a variety of scientific production from different disciplines and perspectives that print their analysis of the definition and scope of the concept, which invites to study peace from a transdisciplinary perspective.

Some examples are religious, where the reconciliation, as mentioned before, is linked to other concepts such as forgiveness, repentance, or atonement; more often found in Catholicism and Christianity with worldwide acclaimed authors like Desmond Tutu. In psychology, where it is most associated with a process of attitudinal and emotional change, or personal healing. In philosophy, for example, it is associated with the logical definition of the outline of the concept itself. In law studies, it is related to justice, truth, reparation and memory. While in history it is associated with the temporality of the concept and how much time it covers. In comparison, the economy field presupposes a need for more inclusive context changes and interrelates with the development agenda (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016, pp. 520-521). Lastly, the studies of political reconciliation, inform on the need for an inter-group dialogue, the construction of a common future, and the transformation of ideologies, beliefs, narratives and identities to be more connected with the post-conflict scenario (Dormer & Woelk, 2018; Harrowell, 2018; Johnson, 2018). The previous attest hate, resentment, peace, and tolerance can be taught and learned; hence they can be modified.

After reviewing the spectrum of the word reconciliation, and in the need to use the concept, and for the purposes of the article, I will understand it as wide as possible. Therefore, as explained above, within the range of possibilities, the political reconciliation studies approach is closer to the article’s interest. Primarily, the discipline approaches the term from a perspective which is relevant to seeking dialogue between different apprehensions, actors and contexts in which the concept is used. As a result, reconciliation will be understood henceforth as a political and psychological process, in which “attempts are made to achieve coexistence and acceptance; that relates to levels of inter-group and interpersonal conflict; that must precede the cessation of violence, dialogue, goodwill, and emotional and attitudinal change” (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016, p. 519).

Additionally, the present article acknowledges the existence of actions favorable for reconciliation, such as: losing the fear of living together —in the case of an inter-group logic, Us v. Them—, taking on the blame for the conflict —need for recognition of responsibility for actions that violate others rights as unfair harm—, allow new narratives to enter social discussions in different spaces —recognize others from their place of enunciation—, mutual respect —minimum agreements with maximum respect—, the construction of a different future —perceiving the need for change— (Little 2012; Sooka 2006) and the adoption of new forms of non-violent disagreements (Acevedo, 2018; Little, 2012, p. 86). In the end, it comprises an effort to, somehow, ease its’ reach to promote opening space to voices, experiences, stories and identities that had no place during armed confrontation periods to make reconciliation an attainable possibility. At last, it means celebrating small victories to promote further initiatives that advance toward the wider goal of national reconciliation. In other words, it means accepting transition is a long process made up of thousands of individual and collective actions that pay off in the long run, not the short term.

In this context, the concept of responsibility contributes to the extent that it expands the range of those responsible, not only to repair the victims but to build peace. It is clear that transitional justice’s formula depends on each country and its Government (Espejo, 2020), but adopting the term of responsibility as proposed previously means to set the focus on moving from a guilty ex-combatants discourse to a larger picture one where society, and everyone in it, plays a role, not just as victims or former armed actors, but as citizens that, despite being heterogenous, together make up the national political collective. Moreover, when those responsible for atrocities can be companies, public officials or members of the Armed Forces, among others (Atteberry, 2019; Wheeler, 2018). Such an approach can benefit organizations like truth commissions or special courts to ensure truth, justice, and non-repetition. Especially, considering that reconciliation as an objective involves civil society as a receptor of those who complete DDR processes. Therefore, adopting the proposed reading aims to change the logic of social relations to benefit a reconciliation atmosphere, under the idea that every individual has the power to contribute to or hinder the process.

On the other hand, the adoption of the concept of responsibility in terms of reconciliation would be convenient in contexts of transitional justice because it recognizes and acknowledges the existence of the numerous debates, and multiple positions regarding reconciliation. The decision to link the proposed definition of responsibility to a flexible definition of reconciliation seeks to make it broader to increase its adaptability to multiple contexts. Especially, because the differences between actors, positions, interests, and values ​​in the post-conflict scenarios differ from case to case. Hence, it is an opportunity to make totalizing categories more flexible and work towards one of the intermediate objectives of transitional justice: recognition and civic trust. While approximating the long-term objectives: reconciliation and democracy, as proposed by Professor De Greiff and Rangel-Suárez (2009).

Morality and Trust

I will develop the concept of moral reparation to determine whether the adoption of responsibility as a concept is appropriate for promoting reconciliation, recognition, and mutual respect in post-conflict societies. Additionally, I will make this exercise from the underlying moral duty for citizens to contribute to [re]build the social tissue, not to tie, or limit other fellow citizens with predetermined categories limiting their identities. I will focus on what they can do together taking language as a starting point and identifying its capacity to build or hinder the process. It is worth noting that the enunciation of self-designation (identity) is considered an architect of reality. I mean that the way we perceived ourselves is linked to how we present to the world, and at the same time, that fellow citizens recognize our self-designation impacts our relationship to the collective; and how we interact or not with it, including emotional responses belonging from which feelings of collective responsibility emerge.

The academic Margaret Urban-Walker (2006) develops the concept of moral repair, in her book with the same title, referring to this type of reparation as the most difficult to achieve, while being the most appropriate at the same time. Moral repair seeks to compensate victims to the point of reversing all kinds of damage —physical, economic, psychological, etc.— including, of course, moral. Particularly, it recognizes the difficulty in achieving this type of reparation in the face of obstacles such as the mere existence of memory and establishes that it must be aimed high so that it is achieved to the highest possible standards.

Urban-Walker describes that moral repair has to do with the deterioration that results in a person's confidence when s/he has been attacked, which leads to deep distortions and areas of civic-social distrust (Urban-Walker, 2006, pp. 73-74). The author develops her idea with an emphasis on five events: the reason and focus of trust; predetermined trust; trust transgressions; distortions of responsibility and objectionable attitudes; and the question: is it better, abandonment or guarantee? She describes how to achieve moral reparation, which is born from the harm imparted to an individual's trust, and seeks to compensate for that moral breakdown, not only with victimizers’ payment of penalties but also seeks the truth of what and why it happened (Urban-Walker, 2006, pp. 72-73). Both are equally important in the reparation and [re]construction process after armed conflicts, wars, or genocides.

Hence, trust is a belief built from good perceptions, the characteristics, and images of the fellow - citizens (Offe, 1999, pp. 5-6): they are the reason and focus of trust. That means people trust someone when they have a good concept of that individual and there is no reason to fear or think s/he means any bad. As explained by Urban-Walker, it is the satisfaction of what the individual expects when they trust someone, not as something that passes through time, but as a matter of the expected response (Greeley et al., 2020; Urban-Walker, 2006, p. 75). Trust is when A trusts in B something about C, under the scoop of duty (Urban-Walker, 2006, p. 76). What is called the normative expectation, and creates the link between dependence and responsibility.

In consequence, predetermined trust is something truly important for the daily life of every human being. Trust, when broken, presupposes a sense of damage to the stability and security the State is supposed to ensure. From both the individual and the community levels, is presumed an institutional effort to restore trust between individuals and the State (Urban-Walker, 2006, p. 83). Urban-Walker describes the fuzzy predetermined trust as the one that leads to responsibility and works under the assumptions of what is “acceptable or normal” in the behavior of an institution (Urban-Walker, 2006, pp. 85-86). Institutions as a substitute for trust, as explained by Offe (1999) are the simple and easy way out of the lack of trust in others, as they embody the dependence on what is regulated. In theory, it is easier to trust institutions, since they have pre-established statutes, which make individuals believe in operations and their results, without any interference or destruction (Offe, 1999, p. 18); therefore, uncertainty decreases. Properly designed institutions can allow citizens to trust strangers with whom no common or relevant alliances are shared, beyond the knowledge and respect of the rules under which the institution they are both bound to operate.

Based on the foregoing, it is important to bring up the definition of the Former Navy Seal Jocko Willink and Babin (2017) who, after explaining tragic events on the battlefield, states that individuals can generate confidence around them by taking responsibility for their actions. This is an important link to understanding why responsibility is a tool that must be considered when it comes to truth commissions and the joint processes of transitional justice. Since trust is a necessary condition for cooperative activity, and where there is a need for willingness to trust another in certain ways (Williams, 2002, p. 88).

Trust implies recognizing others and granting positive, or at least non-negative values; since there is a common space and an understanding that they are likely to meet again. Hence not only can they be trusted, but it is within their interest to be reliable. This sense of trust starts from not expecting aggression from a third party. To have some peace of mind for the safety and well-being of others. In addition, it should be noted that this type of relationship can evolve to expect from others good intentions or aid (Williams, 2002), leaving non-aggression as a minimum of coexistence for the action of cooperation.

In this area, responsibility is important because, considering the social environment as a whole, as well as its bases and sets of beliefs, the concept allows and invites the reconstruction of civic trust. Which is one of the intermediate objectives of transitional justice. This is significant because if people distrust their fellow citizens, they can hardly identify themselves within the same political collective, as equals. It is also important because it helps rebuild the ties of closeness and cooperation, which is not only necessary for the [re] construction of the social tissue but peacebuilding, reconciliation and democracy as long-term objectives of transitional justice (De Greiff & Rangel-Suárez, 2009).

Responsibility as an alternative

“Revenge does not accrue anything: it adds new violence to the preceding violence; but this addition does not stop the violence, it prepares new outbreaks of it in the future. Violence only breeds violence, it is a pendular movement that expands over time instead of deaden itself”

–Quote to Primo Levi in Todorov (2002, p. 216).

Next, I will elaborate on a brief account of the elements of analysis before the presentation of the proposal. Having developed the concept of responsibility, the context in which it takes place, transitional justice and what it is supposed to achieve: reconciliation. Elements such as morality and trust have surfaced as essential for the proposed goal of encouraging the employability of responsibility. The previous is considered under the light of identifying the need to find a concept to replace the use of “victimizers”, primarily, because they will be addressed during the transition process – either as individuals or collectives- by different agents and parts of society indistinctly on ranks regardless of stages, they are at in the DDR process.

To begin, I propose to speak of responsibles with the understanding of reconciliation as a moment in which “political rights are implanted through the struggles for recognition” (Tilly, 2007, p. 31).

The struggles that take place within the limits that define the categories, the social phenomena that take place in these contexts —violent and transitional periods—, are not fortuitous, neither the lack of recognition towards others and the attempt to impose a moral binding category or as I call them, binary and reductionist. Failing to acknowledge the limitations brought by the aforementioned struggles would be a terrible mistake and an oversimplification of the networks of individuals and processes involved in advancing the peacebuilding agenda. The proposal of responsibility derives altogether from what Elizabeth Kiss (2000) contemplates regarding justice, who states that justice, like recognition, implies acknowledging a diversity of identities, the efforts to repair the harm suffered, stigmatization, disrespect, and the inclusion of all the stories in the collective history (Kiss, 2000, p. 73). Which aims to break circles of hate, resentment, revenge and, subsequently, violence.

Another important aspect that serves as a magnifying glass for the review of the victimizer category is to understand both identity and narrative influence the way they are perceived by others and affect the way they present themselves (Espejo, 2021). Part of my proposal to adopt the concept of responsibility as an alternative to this category is the recognition of self-designation and the construction of one's identity beyond existing differences. Fellow citizens’ opinions on peace, reconciliation, or even justice, should not limit former combatants’ reincorporation into society as civilians.

In a sense, it supports Grossberg’s (2003) proposal against the logic of otherness, since it allows identity generation from identity itself, accompanied by positivity, agency, and change; tacitly moving away from static essentialisms. It implies the inclusion of new knowledge and experiences, not only of more actors —including subordinates from the same level— but also of the different narratives in which these new actors are related. This is of great value, especially in a post-conflict context, because it fosters recognition and invites individuals to be citizens who make use of their agency towards a transition from war to peace.

It is relevant to clarify the proposal is specially intended for adopting a more adequate concept for victimizers during post-conflict for one specific reason. As developed in the first article, the use of concepts such as “victim” and “victimizer” is either an imposed, or self-imposed label for the first, and a completely imposed one by others for the second. This is why my proposal focuses on that population, more specifically but not limited to those who were part of the lowest ranks —private combatants—, without recognizing it is as important to let victims [re] build their identity, as it is for former combatants during transitioning periods, especially in contexts where they are persecuted and assassinated for their conditions as reincorporated individuals (Rodríguez-Velásquez, 2017; Valencia-Agudelo, 2021). In sum, I propose to endorse the following comprehension with regards to those who have been labelled as “victimizers”.

In the first article, I outlined transitional justice, where I established the field studies' change in character during and after a given violent event or period. I criticized the fact that the concepts of victim and victimizer are circumscribed to specific events and I developed the discussion around the concept of identity and how an individual becomes one or the other, as well as the relationship forged by harm where one is the object and the other subject. As a result, it became clear that the concept of perpetrator evokes the changes in character that an individual can express in both moments, during and after that given event —a violent one. Therefore, responsibility constitutes a concept that I find relevant to consider for being more appropriate in the context of transitional justice and to refer to the primary actors of armed conflicts who change and reinvent their identity during post-conflict (Figure 1). Those actors are typically addressed as victimizers, combatants, and perpetrators.

Nonetheless, it is important to state the proposal does not exempt the need to name the atrocities that took place during the violent period, as well as bring the maximum responsibles to justice —whether under restorative, retributive, ordinary or the agreed type of justice. Ideally, transitional processes should have victims and their reparation at the center, and as a result, measures to repair them need to be taken to successfully discourage vengeance.

Another important clarification is that, for the article’s sake, the accountability process takes place, as suggested in Figure 1. at the beginning of the DDR process. The proposal welcomes the victimizers that have an interest in reintegrating into society and settling with justice as well as with victims. To give a broader explanation I would need to select a case study, which, for reasons of space and relevance, I will not develop in this opportunity. However, the proposal suggests differentiating between the level of vulnerability of the low-rank combatants adopting the reintegration process who are complying with justice, truth, reparation and non-repetition requisites, and those who are spoilers or have no intention to cease illegal activities. Plus, another key factor is whether they are found guilty of charges, and/or serving their sentence, victimizers should be allowed the concept of responsibles because the focus is on the future, not on dealing with the amount and form of justice to be sought by special or ordinary justice. I acknowledge that given a specific case study this would translate into different obstacles, but the soul of collective responsibility for a better future remains the underlying idea.

Figure 1. : Responsibility in Time

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Based on the above, my proposal for the current article has two dimensions, a formal and an informal. The first addresses formal bodies such as special courts of transitional justice and/or truth commissions. This is to the extent that it is beneficial for reconciliation and peacebuilding to promote a more inclusive language for the ex-combatant population. This means that, for example, in the case of a Truth Commission’s reports, the final documents mention “responsible of facts/actions” either as individuals or groups, rather than victimizers or perpetrators. To make the final report diminish, or discourage, the reactions of resentment and invite active listening open to the different versions of truth among the heterogeneous social landscape, the transitional special bodies must encourage the use of concepts, definitions, words, and overall language, that highlight the importance of acknowledging others the chance to change.

It is fundamental in any transitional context to stop romanticizing and/or demonizing certain roles, mostly when they are life-threatening every day for the individual living up to those specific categories —i.e. victimizers, victims, social leaders, among others. There is no need to pursue an idea of the perfect victim, or the condemned victimizer. Violences —structural, cultural and direct—, and conflict reduce the decision-making capacity, and in times of transition, the responsibility of citizens should be and must be encouraged to be, to acknowledge the human dignity intrinsic to all human beings (Margalit, 1998) and to become, together, a decent society.

Additionally, the proposal stems from recognizing the privileged place from which these special bodies pronounce. Bodies whose mandate is to assure the holistic implementation of the mechanisms of truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition guarantees. The proposal is addressed to these bodies because they attempt to be some sort of reset button for new social logic, especially those that follow and participate in their processes. Which turns them into reception environments for the ex-combatants of illegal groups, and objects of criticism by sectors of the society. Moreover, in the middle of a Digital Age where the language used online on social media platforms influences political and social debates, and ultimately, decision-making (Suárez & Lizama-Mué, 2020).

The language these exceptional bodies use and promote does matter, and directly impacts reality. It is worth clarifying that at no time the proposal seeks to dilute, nor minimize the guilt, or the severity of the violent acts. This is why from the beginning of the article a tacit differentiation was made between individual guilt and social responsibility. In contrast, this formal dimension of the proposal aims to give a chance to ex-combatants to re-create their identities once they have settled with justice. It is about adopting a language that invites understanding, and comprehension of others’ experiences rather than summarizing them upon decisions taken in the past, which could delimit their future and, therefore, become an obstacle for transitioning from arm holders to citizens.

Another edge of the formal dimension of the proposal is the expansion of the range of responsible parties. Since, as has been seen in multiple conflicts, there are more sectors of society involved with mass violations in addition to the State and Armed Forces. As can be enterprises and multinationals that benefit from the continuity of armed conflict hostilities in certain countries, or regions of the world. These actors should be directly involved despite not being weapon bearers, society should demand they are subject to inquiry by the special byproduct organisms created for transitional purposes such as special tribunals and commissions. Not considering these actors could translate into neglecting victims to be acknowledged, or receive guarantees of truth, justice, and/or non-repetition. Also, not involving them could lead to an incapacity to address the root causes of conflict and increase susceptibility to repetition.

Likewise, it means balancing the power load represented by the construction of the official truth. That is, although history is usually told by the “winners”, especially in cases where there is no peace agreement, it is important to rescue the political use that is given to the decisions emanating from the transitional justice scenarios —as stated before. This is because if one speaks of “individuals responsible for facts” in these formal spaces, it is possible to contribute to the reduction of stigmas, both of illegal and legal armed combatants. Rejecting their previous decisions and actions, while allowing them to be recognized as themselves within a political and social collective to which they can contribute from their own identity and story. In addition to contributing to the [re]construction of civic trust, and the generation of less resentful social environments.

For its part, the most informal sense of the proposal is addressed to civil society. Throughout the article, and especially in line with what is established by Arendt (1968), this constitutes an invitation to citizens to recognize their role in peacebuilding. Although it is understood and respected that it is not in the interest of many to participate in the process, ordinary citizens have the power to reproduce violence, either physical or psychological, using arms or words as a weapon as portrayed in the third article of the series “Recognizing identities: using language to prevent resentment”. As well as to impede social processes by the simple fact of belonging to the social and political collective. This means that, although some do not want to participate, they are supposed to at least be aware of the danger of reproducing dynamics of resentment, exclusive discourses or replication of stigmas and labels about people whose reality is complex and probably, fail to grasp.

Another angle of the informal dimension is directed at the media. Journalists, opinion leaders, politicians, and activists are continuously reporting on the advances or delays of transitional processes implementation. They choose a word set that has the chance to build toward a common future or a distrustful one. Besides, what we reproduce online has an enormous impact on informing others, making them aware of the context and its implications, multiplying fake news – that can potentially endanger complete collectives-, and influencing the political debate as a result. Media can contribute to deepening the differences between citizens in polarized societies, as it sets the tone on what is likely to be reproduced by public opinion in a democracy (Aral & Eckles, 2019). And sets the tone and draws the limit on what is accepted by society in the social and political arenas.

Finally, it is worth noting the proposal has limitations. Since this is not a case study of any particular country but a theoretical exercise, to implement this approach on real processes there would be necessary to perform a close examination of the case, the root causes of conflict, the state of civic trust, institution’s capacity and credibility, the path that led to a transitional context and the decisions made upon special organisms such as their mandates independence from conflict parties, among others. It is possible that to adopt a critical approach to responsibility there would be a need of engaging citizens in public policy efforts that cover all social spectrums, since matters of political culture, citizenship duties and rights are at the core, and therefore, need to be covered to transform societies’ logic from a violent to a peaceful, or at the very least, respectful one.