Abstract:
A double answer is given to the question: 'does global citizenship require modern technology?' First, it does not because the idea of global citizenship as membership of a universal moral community goes back to the ancient Stoics. Second, it does, because the adequate expression of global responsibility in the modern world requires the development of global culture and global institutions for which modern technologies of communication and transportation are crucial: modern technology furthermore gives us both knowledge of the world and the capacity to act at a distance. The discussion provides a peg on which to defend the idea of global citizenship in both its ethical and its institutional aspects against the criticisms made of it for instance from relativist or communitarian perspectives.

Key words: Citizenship, communitarianism, cosmopolitanism, culture, global ethic, global obligations/responsibilities, globalisation, institutions, motivation, relativism, universal values.

Resumen: ¿Requiere la ciudadanía global la tecnología moderna?
La pregunta “requiere la ciudadanía global la tecnología moderna?” recibe una doble respuesta. En primer lugar no la requiere ya que la idea de ciudadano global como miembro de una comunidad moral universal se remonta a los antiguos estoicos. Por otro lado sí la requiere, ya que la expresión adecuada de la responsabilidad global en el mundo moderno necesita del desarrollo de una cultura global y de instituciones globales, para lo cual las tecnologías modernas de comunicación y transporte son cruciales: la tecnología moderna nos brinda tanto un conocimiento del mundo como la capacidad de actuar a distancia. La discusión brinda un punto de apoyo con base en el cual defender la idea de ciudadanía global, tanto en su aspecto ético como en su aspecto institucional, de las críticas que se plantean desde, por ejemplo, perspectivas relativistas y comunitaristas.

Palabras clave: ciudadanía, comunitarismo, cosmopolitismo, cultura, ética global, obligaciones/responsabilidades globales, globalización, instituciones, motivación, relativismo, valores universales.

1. Introduction

One immediate answer to this question might be: ‘The answer is obvious! Of course being a global citizen requires modern technology. How on earth could one know about a famine in Ethiopia, let alone send assistance to that country, without modern technology?’ However one needs to remember that there were people in the ancient world like the Stoics who regarded themselves as citizens of the
world, and that that did not involve modern technology, but a certain conception of one's status as a human being. So in one sense being a global citizen, that is accepting a global ethic or identity, does not require modern technology. But in the sense of 'someone who can effectively exercise global responsibility in the modern world', then global citizenship does involve modern technology. The simple answer 'Yes and No - It depends on what you mean' does indeed summarise my position, but a whole lot of highly contentious issues need to be raised, if we are to understand why these two answers can be given and what the relationship is between them.¹

The issues are important partly because I am also addressing a wider issue concerning global citizenship: how important is it that we think of ourselves as global citizens? The title of the article is kind of peg on which to hang what I take to be one of the most important matters facing us at the beginning of the twenty-first century: what needs to be done if we are to tackle all the immense problems facing the world? Many things of course, not least the development of technologies to serve humankind. Arguably though a key factor is the transformation of consciousness, from one dominated by national and other forms of localised identity and loyalties, to one in which our global identity has a proper place. This is not an argument against other levels of identity and loyalty, but an argument for a change of attitude and for an inclusion of another level of identity which in turn will affect the policies of nation-states and international business.

Some examples may serve to introduce what I take to be a variety of actions which are expressions of global citizenship. In 1998 a large number of people converged on Birmingham in Britain to form a large human chain around the place where the G8 countries -the rich industrialised countries- were meeting to discuss Third World debt and in effect their management of the global economy. This chain was a symbol of their solidarity with the poor of the world who suffer because of the continuing impact of Third World debt, and an expression of the call on the G8 countries to cancel the worst debts. Others may prefer other form of action, like writing to their Members of Parliaments, writing letters and articles for newspapers, and so on. At any rate a groundswell of public concern has developed. It is I think no accident that Gordon Brown the UK Chancellor and President Clinton both strongly endorsed such cancellation. Whether such political action is based political expedience and the calculation of popularity or reflects empowerment or the use of an opportunity to do what they think right anyway is another matter. The point is that changing public opinion changes the parameters of political action.

¹ For a more elaborate account of the arguments for and against, cf. Dower 2002.
Another kind of global citizenship action takes the form of consumer choice. As consumers we may avoid environmentally damaging products, or prefer to buy brands of coffee like Cafedirect, produced and marketed by Third World co-operatives, rather than other commercial brands of coffee, in support of better work conditions. In the USA members of many churches got involved in the 1970s in the Sanctuary movement—giving Latin American refugees (often for economic reasons) sanctuary in churches—thus conflicting with the authorities in a global form of civil disobedience. Perhaps one of the most striking examples of the exercise of global citizenship in recent years in ‘global civil society’ was the World Court Project where a groundswell of expressions of ‘public conscience’ led to an advisory opinion being sought by the United Nations from the World Court on the legality of possessing nuclear weapons in international law. Its opinion, which in spirit though not straightforwardly came out against their legality, was issued on July 9th, 1996 (World Court 1996).

Now many of these forms of action, like the last two, may be criticised by some as ineffectual or inappropriate. But the point needs to be made that although one might reject the whole global perspective, such criticisms are more likely to come from a position in which some other forms of action are supported in relation to global concerns, that is from another global citizenship perspective, and in which those actions are acknowledged as the actions of ‘global citizens’.

2. Outline of Argument

Let me now outline an argument which I shall then go through and answer what seem to me to be the more obvious objections to its various stages.

(a) To accept a global ethic is to accept the idea of being a global citizen: the idea that one is member of one moral domain of all human beings.

(b) Moral thought requires the acceptance of a global ethic with two components: (i) some universal values (ii) some global obligations, i.e. obligations which are global or trans-national in scope.

(c) A global ethic adequate to the late 20th Century and early 21st Century requires the socio-political expression of global citizenship.

(d) Socio-political global citizenship requires both (i) the culture of global citizenship (involving the internalisation of the identity of persons as global citizens) and (ii) the institutions of global citizenship.

(e) A necessary condition for the development of the culture and institutions of global citizenship is the development of modern technologies (especially those of communication).

(f) Therefore, modern technology is necessary for the actualisation
of the idea of global citizenship in the modern world (though it is not necessary for the idea itself).²

3. The Idea of Global Citizenship

As I indicated earlier, the idea of global citizenship goes back to ancient thought. Many of the Stoics accepted and proclaimed the idea that human beings were 'cosmo-polites', literally citizens of the cosmos or universe. Although this conception of course is much broader than citizenship of the world, it did include the latter in the sense that all human beings were seen to be part of the larger 'polis' or community. What they were contrasting this with was the membership of particular established political communities – of city-states, countries or even the Roman Empire. That one was born an Athenian or Cretan or part of the Roman Empire was simply a contingent fact – an accident of birth – to be contrasted to something more basic about one's nature and identity. The idea of being a 'citizen' has to be treated with some caution here. It is not meant to imply a relationship which one has with a state or organised political community led by a ruler, emperor or other form of government, but it is meant to imply the existence of a wider community to which one has some loyalty and with which one has some identity.³ Neither for the Stoics, nor for most cosmopolitans since, does cosmopolitanism imply the need for a world government (though some have advocated it, notably H.G. Wells).⁴

What I think is of enduring importance from the ideas of the Stoics and others is the thought that human beings belong to one moral community or domain. Although we do as a matter of contingent fact also live in other more particular and smaller communities – state, town, family – it is an important fact that we also belong to a larger community (civitas maxima) made up of all human beings (and, for many, much else besides). The word 'citizen' here is not doing very much conceptual work, in that it is really only signifies the basic idea of being a member of a moral community. (We will however make the idea of 'citizen' do much more work later on.) But even here at this stage this basic relationship presupposes a number of important elements.

² I should perhaps explain how I came to be interested in these matters. I taught for a number of years a course on ethics and international relations, defending the idea of a global ethic or cosmopolitanism (as it is often called) against rival theories of international relations, an outcome of which was World Ethics - the New Agenda (Dower 1998). During 1997-1999 I directed a Project devoted to exploring ways in which different kinds of courses on global citizenship available to undergraduates may be developed, and some of the thinking of this article was stimulated by discussions in this Project group.


⁴ Cf. Heater 1996, for an excellent historical survey.
First, there are some core values which make it a community; second, a sense of commitment to and loyalty towards the community as a whole and towards its members.  

4. A Global/World Ethic

The acceptance of these two elements is tantamount to accepting what I shall call a global ethic or world ethic. A world ethic is an ethic which asserts that there are certain universal values and certain global responsibilities or duties. When a thinker asserts a global ethic, he or she is not saying that these values and responsibilities are in fact already accepted by everyone or every society. But he or she is saying that these values and responsibilities are to-be-accepted, either because they are true or because they are reasonable. Often in the past, conflicts like those generated by the Crusades, the Conquistadors or the proselytising activities of 19th century missionaries in Africa occurred partly because believers in global values sought to spread them to those who did not accept them. It is not however necessary that this is how a global ethic has to be construed or promoted: a global ethic which affirms solidarity or commitment to tackle needs anywhere on the one hand with sensitivity towards different cultures on the other hand is what I advocate—the global analogue of a multicultural society which combines responsibility for all with affirmation of diversity.

Meanwhile we should note that there are many different forms of global ethics and kinds of theory supportive of them. Apart from religious conceptions such as the Christian conception of the brotherhood of humankind, ethical theories—such as Kant’s theory, utilitarianism or human rights theories—all point to the same basic position: all human beings have the same ethical status, and in principle one has duties to be concerned with any other human beings.

It was Kant himself who promoted the idea of cosmopolitanism in the modern era. There were really two elements to his cosmopolitanism, his basic moral theory which postulated that it was here and now our duty to respect the rational agency of all fellow human beings, and his teleological conception of history in which, as illustrated in his essay ‘The idea of a universal history with a cosmopolitan intent’ he envisaged a long way off the emergence of a federal world order of which we would be in the political sense ‘citizens’ (cf. Kant 1991a). Two things should be noted. Kant did not, despite his reputation in international relations circles of being a revolutionary, advocate the disbandment of the nation-state system in favour of world government. Far from it—he saw world government as dangerous. Ra-

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5 For a full account of the Stoics cf. Heater 2002, see also Dower 2003.
6 For the idea of solidarist-pluralism, see Dower 1998.
ther he advocated the development of republican constitutions, which, because they were founded on principles of freedom and equality, as shown as explicitly as anywhere in the constitution of the USA, would incline men to live peacefully with one another, and thus would come to adopt certain articles of peace which would guarantee, in the words of another famous essay, 'perpetual peace' (cf. Kant 1991b). Second, even if we doubt the eventual emergence of a world federal system, we can still see in Kant a powerful conception of a cosmopolitan moral order in the here and now, in his stress on the rational agency of human beings as the basis of a universal morality, or a global ethic as I am calling it.

This idea of a global morality which underpins what I shall call the moral conception of global citizenship is of course not uncontroversial. Many thinkers past and present have denied it, for a variety of reasons. I focus on two. First, relativist arguments are advanced, whether in the more classical forms of thinkers like Protagoras or more recently under the guise of postmodernist rejection of the Enlightenment's project of universal reason. According to these arguments values vary from culture to culture so there is no universal morality. Related to this, but coming from a slightly different angle, are communitarian arguments, from writers like Sandel and MacIntyre that values and duties arise from the particular traditions of established communities (cf. Sandel 1982; MacIntyre 1981). Thus MacIntyre once condemned those who advocate global citizenship by saying that in making people citizens of everyone they made them rootless citizens of nowhere.7

A full reply to these difficulties is not possible here, but I merely remark the following. First, relativism makes the idea of progress suspect and the position of minority dissent difficult to make sense of. But it also, despite itself, loses the common core of values in human nature which is ultimately the bulwark against arbitrary treatment. Karl-Otto Apel once noted that it was Spanish philosophers like Vitoria who were able to condemn the Spanish treatment of the Aztecs from their 'natural law' position, whereas the relativist who treats other cultures as 'other' or 'different' has no theoretical ground to protest if the 'other' lacks the common ethical core associated with 'humanity' (cf. Apel 1992). If relativists pride themselves with respecting diversity, this is an accident, and certainly not part of the logic of their position. As for MacIntyre's remonstration, it is not clear that there cannot be — indeed as we shall see, it is clear that there must be — levels of identity which are meaningful at the global level, though of course they does not rule out more genuinely local levels as well. As for the theoretical point about the source of morality, moral community as based on esta-

7 Quoted in Almond 1990.
blished traditions surely needs to express values which we can defend independently of them, rather than the other way round. It is because all human beings matters that we need to develop established community to express this and make certain forms of action more lively and robust—but I anticipate my later argument here—I conclude that neither relativism nor communitarianism provides a successful challenge to the idea of global citizenship as a moral claim about the world.

5. The Modern World

I now turn to the conditions of the modern world. What makes active global citizenship essential? It is of course a cliche to say that we live in a highly interdependent or globalised world. I just want to highlight several salient features of it. First, the fact is that our activities, in industry and in the use of the land and sea, are severely damaging the environment. Much of this is in the form of global impacts caused by others for our sake. We also contribute directly by our own acts to the cumulative impacts, e.g. in burning fossil fuels. Second, the globalisation of the economy (called the global economy) involves vast complex economic relationships such that our economic activities are connected by long causal chains to what happens elsewhere in the world—like workers getting minimum wages on which they barely survive, appalling safety standards and so on. What these two facts of globalisation demonstrate is that, unlike the past, we are all involved in processes which are damaging to fellow humans and the environment at a distance. The third factor, the globalisation of institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, and of communications, has led to a massive increases in the capacity to take action to moderate the negative effects of our actions and also positively to respond to suffering, whether or not we are implicated in being part of its cause.

It is said that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, that in order for us to say that we ought to take action we must be able to take action. To be able to take action requires both the knowledge that we can—provided by communication technologies—and the resources and means to hand—provided by modern institutions (together with technologies, transport systems, etc.). That is, we can, if we have the knowledge, take action at a distance by joining Non-Governmental Organisations, by campaigning within the political system to influence the direction of foreign policy of our governments, by exerting our influences as ‘ethical’ consumers. Another condition of our being able to do things is available motivation—a factor I discuss later on.

The upshot of all this is that the acceptance of a global ethic combined with the facts of the modern world—causal impacts, knowledge and capacity for effective action at a distance—entail a level of active
obligation far in excess of anything which would have in practice been expected in the past. Someone in the past might have accept the ideal of universal charity or the message of the good Samaritan, but rarely had the opportunity for effective expression of this beyond the more immediate community in which she lived. But now that same ethic, coupled with the realities of the world, leads to the recognition that many things that can actually be done, and need to be done, take their rationale and point from their effects on other parts of the world or on the world as a whole.

What then we need is a recognition that in the modern world a global citizen ought in fact to accept responsibility for her actions on a global scale and see part of her significant duty the discharge of this responsibility. For this to happen though two things will be needed – the development of an appropriate culture and the development of appropriate institutions. Both of these require modern technology. But before we expand on this, I need to address two objections which may be raised to the conclusions which we have just reached –the argument from optimism, and the argument from the ‘hidden hand’ combined with the value of liberty.

6. Objections

First, my conclusion will be resisted on the grounds that my reading of the world situation is far too gloomy. Things are not anything like as bad as I sketched, and in any case, to the extent that there are problems of poverty and environmental danger, as there undoubtedly are, these will be effectively addressed through appropriate technological adaptations. Human beings are, as Julian Simon once claimed, in The Ultimate Resource, intelligent, adaptable creatures who are resourceful in finding new ways of responding to problems (cf. Simon 1981). We simply do not need people generally to ‘take on the world’ or worry about problems at a distance from them: look after the poverty and damage in your own backyard, and leave others to get on with their own. Even if this position is adopted and what is done is done as a contribution to a better world, and, as the adage goes, it is an example of ‘think globally and act locally’, this means just that –don’t act globally. There is nothing really to do. If you are going to be global citizen, make sure you are inactive about it.

Related to this line of thought is the old idea of Adam Smith’s that hidden hand mechanisms still work well. If people and in particular nation-states look after their own interests properly in an enlightened way, then by a hidden hand process, all will work out well in the long run everywhere. Part of this argument, often called economic libertarianism, is a belief that people should have, as a value in its
own right, as much economic liberty as possible, and that generally there are not extensive duties to come to the aid of others.

Though libertarian arguments are very fashionable at present, I have to say that such arguments seem to fly in the face of the facts. Since species continue to be destroyed at a steady rate and the absolute poverty figures continue on their upward spiral, it is hard to think that the relatively unregulated effect of human economic activity are proving adequate or show that greater self-conscious efforts to act at a distance are redundant.

What the last approach illustrates is an important point about global ethics and global citizenship. There may be a variety of global ethics which can be adopted. I do not mean different theories, which I have already mentioned, but different approaches about what is actually good for the world and what ought to be done. Being a global citizen should not be seen, though it often is, as shorthand for being committed to Oxfam, Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth and the Peace movement. Someone who thought that it really was important that everyone adopt the individualistic and secular values of the free market, would be, and might well see herself as, a global citizen without supporting these organisations or their approaches—especially if she thought it worth making efforts to defend and promote these libertarian values. This is to be expected.

Whatever the differences between citizenship at the global level and citizenship in its normal political setting, this is certainly in common. We do not expect a citizen—I mean a good citizen in the sense of taking his duty of citizenship seriously—necessarily to hold particular views about what should be done. These views might fall within a range of positions from the left to the right. So likewise it is with global citizenship. So long as one holds on to the idea that all humans matter in one community of concern and that there are things which individuals can do and do with reference to this wider whole, there may be significant differences in the values to be promoted. That said, it is probably true that for the majority of those who actively promote the idea of global citizenship, there is a certain set of normative concerns which drive them, such as solidarity with the poor, the need to change our way of life because of the environment, working for peace and campaigning against human rights violations.

7. Institutional Framework needed

Earlier I suggested that in order for this kind of active expression of global citizenship to be effective we need appropriate institutions and culture, which in turn require modern technology for their existence. The institutional opportunities for global citizenship can I think be identified in three modes: the international system of states, the phe-
nomenon of global trade and investment, and the development of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). These three phenomena all represent aspects of the phenomenon of globalisation. Increasingly in each area individuals can, if they so wish, exert influences in respect to the global concerns which they have. This may seem obvious in the case of NGOs, since NGOs are precisely the collective expression of the commitments of individuals, and often have global issues as the focus of their concerns. (In this respect it does not matter whether an NGO is formally a national one or an international one, since a national one, like for instance the World Development Movement in Britain, can have as its primary focus the position of the poor in the South.)

Often the state system and the global economy are seen as quite the opposite - powerful forces often acting contrary to the values of global citizens. Thus we have the powerful image of Marc Nerfin's paper "Not Prince nor Merchant but Plain Citizen", arguing the case for the development of citizen power. But in fact the opportunities for the expression of global citizenship power exist in the other two arenas as well. Of course the international system may remain what it has largely been - a society of nation-states primarily devoted to maintaining the inter-national order itself along with state sovereignty and within this framework, the promotion of national interests. However at the end of the day, what governments promote is broadly a function of what their citizens want, and if, especially in a democracy, large numbers of citizens signalled their concerns for global issues, things would change. It is of course a big 'if'. But the reality is that, as it is, citizens have, at least in democratic countries, ample opportunity to lobby, influence the political parties they join and so on, and if their agenda is a global agenda, this will have impacts on national policy. Likewise, we are often told about irresistible market forces, but at the end of the day, markets require consumers, and the potential for the exercise of ethical consumer power cannot be underestimated. Again this is a big 'if', but my point is that we can be global citizens in the market place, if we so wish, and if enough of us so wished, changes would be possible.

The institutional framework exists therefore as something through which we can express in effective ways our global citizenship. Do these institutional facts however establish citizenship? To make any real sense of citizenship (other than as a pure moral conception which we discussed earlier) we need a much more formalised structure than is indicated above. Consider the idea of being a European citizen - an idea many of us in Europe find difficult enough making anything of anyway! Surely this requires European institutions far more elaborate

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8 For a full account of globalisation, cf. Scholte 2000.
9 Nerfin 1987.
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than anything we have on a global scale; and more importantly we need a relationship defined formally in a legal or constitutional framework of the rights and duties of European citizenship, including the right to participate in elections of members to the European parliament and so on. That is precisely what we do not have on a global scale. Though the UN Charter started its Preamble with the words 'we the peoples', it is primarily an inter-state organisation not a peoples' organisation.

This line of thought needs to be resisted, because it depends upon an over-simple dichotomy: either global citizenship in the purely moral sense of being a member of a moral community or full-blown citizenship in a single political community under world government. There is surely a halfway house position, which is both intelligible and attractive, in which the idea of 'citizenship' does do some conceptual work, but not that identical to that associated with citizenship of nation-states. I have argued against this dichotomy in another paper (cf. Dower 2000), taking as my target a paper by David Miller entitled 'Bounded Citizenship' (Miller 1998). Briefly his argument is that, although we have global obligations, it is not helpful to express this through the language of citizenship, since citizenship is clearly linked to particular established political communities, with clearly defined rights and duties, participation in decision-making and a shared moral culture. This, according to Miller, is shown more clearly in the republican conception of citizenship (as opposed to the liberal conception with its emphasis on the holding of rights), in the tradition of Aristotle and Rousseau. In reply one needs to note that of course citizenship is highly contested concept itself. For instance, if 'rights' are seen as central such as the social rights which T.H. Marshall is well known for pressing, the human rights framework in the world already provides a framework for global citizenship discourse (cf. Marshall 1973). And this is already important from the point of view of oppressed people in poorer countries who wish to claim, as citizens of the world, their human rights. But it is better to take Miller on his own terms, and argue that other elements of active citizenship or participation are equally applicable at a global level.

8. Cultural Framework

I now turn to the 'culture' side of the story. Elise Boulding once wrote a book entitled Building a Global Civic Culture expressing the importance of this (cf. Boulding 1990). If people generally are both to accept and to act on a global ethic, then there has to develop a culture in which certain attitudes, identities, loyalties and priorities are embedded - in custom, traditions, shared moral rules. Of course such a culture of a shared acceptance of certain values and priorities is not a
necessary condition for someone to have certain ethical views. If that were so, no moral progress would be possible, and minority moral opinion would be unintelligible, since individuals must be able to think out ethical positions prior to and independent of what most people think or what is already in public moral culture. But moral commitment is likely to be more effective precisely when it is shared and re-enforced in a community of concern. (This is the part of the truth about ethics contained in communitarianism). F.H. Bradley, the 19th Century British political idealist, once compared morality to body and soul—the body being the publicly shared rules, practices and institutions of a society, the soul the individual moral wills of agents which breathe life into them (cf. Bradley 1878). This is broadly right—though my global and non-conservative application of the insight probably would not have pleased Bradley! It is precisely with the development of an ethical culture in which certain global identities and values are embodied, that people will be induced to act out their global responsibilities.

The assumption here is that we can say of people that they do have global responsibilities as global citizens, whether or not they currently accept these. They may not accept it because they have different values (perhaps non-global) or they have different views of the ‘facts’ of the world and also question the necessity of certain forms of collective action. Piet Hein, the Danish poet, famous for his one-line poems, once stood up at a conference and said ‘We are global citizens with tribal souls’ (Barnaby 1988: 192). What he meant by this is that although objectively we are global citizens, that is moral agents with global responsibilities, many of us most or all the time, and all of us some of the time, have a more localised sense of identity with loyalty to the localised group of some kind which dominates our consciousness to the exclusion of others. Whether or not we actually assent in some intellectually weak way to claims that we have global responsibilities, these values are not alive or at the forefront of our moral consciousness, and hence fail to inspire the requisite forms of action. To employ the language of another philosopher, David Cooper, the world and our moral engagement with it are not part of an emotionally charged ‘field of significance’ (cf. Cooper 1992). The encouragement of the development of such moral fields of significance is precisely what is needed, and for that the development of a public culture is necessary. In this connection, the development of human rights thinking, not so much in legal instruments (though these are important too) but in the shared values of people who see themselves as both having a certain status and as belonging to a global community in which in principle there is solidarity and support from others elsewhere, is important. This importance I think can be affirmed even by those
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moral theorists who at the level of theory would prefer a different theory of morality than a foundation in human rights.

The importance of this for education cannot of course be underestimated. In this connection we need to note the arguments of the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum. In a special edition of the Boston Review (Autumn 1994) she argued for cosmopolitan education—the need to educate American children to think of themselves as world citizens with not merely better knowledge of the rest of the world but some understanding of their perspectives. She gave four main arguments: first, we will know better who really are—our essential human-necess not our accidental American-ness or whatever nationality we have; second, we will be more willing and able to carry out our global obligations which are real and pressing, especially towards the billion of the world’s very poor; third, collective global problems e.g. of the environment necessitate such a global outlook; and fourth, if a multicultural society like America is to become genuinely tolerant and accepting of diversity internally, it can only do so on the basis of universal values: bluntly the Chinese in the Chinatowns of the USA are to be respected because the Chinese in China are to be respected. The rest of the special edition was devoted to various American intellectuals taking issue with her. She is nothing if not controversial! But I commend her approach to you. Many of the articles and others are published in a book entitled For Love of Country (cf. Nussbaum 1994: 1996).

But there is an interesting question which is raised as to how one goes about promoting such global values. In 1998 I attended a seminar discussing Britain’s Department of International Development’s White Paper Eliminating Global Poverty. Clare Short the Government Minister joined the seminar at the end and engaged in discussion with us. When I suggested that the section on development education might include some education on global or world citizenship, she retorted that this was really quite inappropriate, because ninety-nine people out of a hundred simply would not resonate to the idea of being called a world or global citizen! I suggested that the White Paper itself was premised on global obligation and the idea of one global society and the idea of global citizenship was merely complementing and reinforcing this. She accepted that these values underlay the Report but rejected the tactic of using this language. Whilst it is obvious from what I have said that I do not think we should avoid introducing the terminology—otherwise it will not make headway— I realised afterwards that a serious issue of approach had been raised. Indeed when I told this story to my Global Citizenship Research Group, I was mildly surprised that some shared her view that in any course for students on global citizenship, one should approach the idea of global citizenship only at the end, having got students interested in issues like the environment, poverty or peace, and then say at the end, in
'whether you realised this or not, what you have been engaging with are the issues of global ethics and the attitudes you have adopted of those of global citizens!'. Clearly this is a matter of 'horses for courses': what will be effective in one context will not be in another. What matters of course is not whether the phrases 'global citizen' or 'world citizen' are used but whether a culture in which concern for the world is expressed and felt is developed.

9. The Need for Modern Technology

I now turn to technology, and to the thesis that without modern technology the kind of global citizenship I have been identifying would not be possible. The two aspects of modern technology –and by 'modern' I am quite arbitrarily thinking primarily of the last fifty years or so– which are more relevant to my theme are the technologies of communication and the technologies of transportation. Ideas, information, decisions, agreements can be transmitted and exchanged with great ease across the world, between individuals and groups in different parts of the world—the Internet being the most conspicuous manifestation of this phenomenon in recent years. Likewise the ease of communications across networks facilitate the growth of larger institutions and organisations, whether government, multinationals, or Non-Governmental Organisation. Larger and faster transportation systems on land, at sea and in the air facilitate the movement of goods and personnel across the world. If we concentrate on the 'active' side of global citizenship, the acceptance of obligations and responsibilities, these two facts are of paramount importance, for as I noted earlier, it is when we have both knowledge of what happens elsewhere, and the capacity to engage in actions which have distant effects, that the stage is set for appropriate action. The third factor of course is moral commitment to do these things and that, as I have just indicated, is strengthened significantly by the cultural setting in which we have enlarged identities as citizens of larger communities. Again the factors of travel and communication play a crucial role in creating this culture, through travel to other parts of the world on business or on holiday, communications with others across cyber-space if not through post or telephone, seeing TV programmes about other parts of the world and so on.

It may be said that often travel and communications do not make good citizens of people. We can watch endless TV about the rest of the world but still remain locked in parochial sentiments. We can travel to other parts of the world in a 'been there, done that' glaze of mind that takes very little in. This is to be granted. But note that I said modern technology is necessary for global citizenship. I did not say it was sufficient or adequate on its own.
But there is another slightly darker side to the role of modern technology in global citizenship. There is a sense that modern technology has made global citizens of us, whether we like it or not. If we recall the idea behind Piet Hein’s remark, we are in some objective sense global citizens just because modern technology has transformed the causal nexus in which we act. That is, it has extended the causal ‘footprint’, as environmentalists sometimes call it, beyond the local to the global in many different ways. Here the technologies which have created the global repercussions of our actions are more general, and are modern in a more extended sense of modern, going back several hundreds of year to the time when the rise of modern science and associated technologies gave human beings unprecedented power over nature. It is the technologies of extracting resources from the natural environment and transforming them through industrial processes into serviceable goods which have caused major damaging effects in the planet as a whole. If the lines of moral responsibility broadly follow the lines of causality and if modern technologies underpinning our way of life have made our causal impacts global, then our responsibility becomes global.

The above remarks may seem to indicate that what is driving this account are environmental impacts. But this is not so. The global economy, driven by the technologies of extraction, transformation and transportation, inextricably links us with the fate of others across the world, and though most of us do not literally actively ‘cause’ the suffering and poverty of others, we are so intimately linked to the cycle of events in which the poverty is a part, that we can hardly dismiss it as not in our domain. 10 Thirdly what nations do to promote their security increasingly impacts on the security of others – responses to September 11th 2001 and Iraq in 2002-2003 have shown how contentious the pursuit of security really is. The technologies of mass destruction – nuclear, biological and chemical – leave us all vulnerable to shared dangers, whilst the arms industry (in which sadly the USA and the UK are market leaders) simply contributes through arms sales to oppression and human rights violations in other parts of the world.

The nub of what I am saying is this: modern technologies on the one hand make us global citizens by making us, whether we like it or not, responsible collectively for global problems; but at the same time they enable us to find the motivational dynamics to exercise our responsibility to tackle those problems. Responsibility is after all Janus-faced: it looks backward to what we are responsible for having caused or allowed, and forward to what we have a responsibility for doing.

10 For a forthright account of this perspective, cf. Pogge 2002.
10. The Paradox of Technology

There is something mildly paradoxical about this outcome. Technology has created the very problems that technology enables us to solve. Global citizenship in the engaged sense I have suggested only becomes possible because of the very forces which make it necessary. Would we have been better off, if we had never got into the situation in the first place, and if we remained citizens of our local communities for whom the idea of global citizenship remained an unactualised ideal rather than a pressing necessity?

This nostalgic 'back to nature' response is here wholly inappropriate. First, because it is impossible in some anti-technology gesture the turn the clock back, and also because in many ways it is undesirable. It is undesirable because despite the dangers and problems, technologies have transformed the lives of billions from lives of necessity to lives of abundance. Aristotle once said that the 'polis' or state was not just for the sake of life but for the sake of the good life (cf. Aristotle 1988). The same could be said of technology. But modern technology is also not to be rejected because the very tendencies it has to create the conditions of global awareness are probably in the long run essential to our moving to greater levels of co-operation in the planet. There is no inherent teleology in history, an unfolding into a state of complete development, perhaps in the style of Hegel or Marx, but nor again have we come to the 'end of history'. If modern technology can help us over the humps of limiting nationalisms or parochialisms, then we could be on the verge of a world in which we really are of a mind to overcome the problems we now face. But there is nothing inevitable about this. We could alternatively blow ourselves or poison ourselves into extinction.

We therefore need to control technology. There is nothing inevitable about technologies. Indeed the proliferation of technologies simply opens up more and more possibilities, since there is simply not the time, energy or resources to pursue more than a few of the endless possibilities which are thrown up. Where there are choices, ethical values are relevant. Choices cannot be made without reference to norms of some kind. If these norms are norms provided by an appropriate global ethic, then technologies which are pro-peace, pro-genuine development or pro-environment will be preferred.

On the other hand, there seems to be a pervasive attitude that the solutions to our global problems lie in technological solutions alone. Technology will fix up the problems it helped to create. This is most striking in the case of the environment, but is actually just as relevant to problems of poverty and violence. We thus emphasise the greening of industry, fitting catalytic converters and so on. We use biotechnology to create new strains of rice or wheat, or develop new technologies
for rural development. We build smarter weapons, or devise more sophisticated systems for monitoring arms sales and so on. All this is important, but it surely not enough. Without real transformations of attitude, such as accepting less affluent life-styles, accepting a sense of solidarity with others in the world, and understanding different cultures as a basis for greater peace in the world.

Global citizenship then requires modern technology, not in the sense of needing it as it is, but in the sense of its being grounded in the facts of modern technology. We have seen this in at least three ways: as the causal context of our global problems, as that which enables global citizenship to be effectively expressed in action, but also as something to be controlled, modified and developed in the light of our global values. Perhaps we could conclude by saying that technology needs a global human face, but at the same time that global citizenship needs a flexible but strong technological backbone.

Bibliografía


