
The main objective of this book is to raise objections to two common-place assumptions about the relationship between language and pain: on the one hand, to the idea that the radically intimate character of pain makes it uncommunicable—and thus, to a certain extent, un-shareable; and second, that because pain has such an effect on our capacity for communicating it, it also shatters language altogether, becoming therefore a limit-case for language’s potentiality to express and communicate (our) experience. As a response to these two assumptions, Ferber’s book shows that, precisely because of the intimacy of pain, and precisely because it would seem to be a limit case for our capacity to communicate and thus to understand others’ private experiences, pain forces us to re-shape our conceptions of language and communicability. Ferber argues that, even though from our usual conceptions of language pain seems to place on us a paradoxical demand— it both rejects our comprehension while simultaneously calling for our understanding and our capacity to “hear” someone’s pain and respond to it accordingly— rather than letting the paradox trap us in an impossible dilemma, and instead of making the gap even deeper by describing pain as the most isolated and isolating experience, we ought to revise our conceptions of language and the structures that allow us to make sense of it as a site for communicability. In Ferber’s words, “any thinking that surrenders to mutually-exclusive structures, lacks the power to grasp pain’s singular nature” (94)— and, I would add, the singular potentiality of language.

To take up this challenge, Ferber goes back to Herder’s theory of language and, more particularly, to the enigmatic role that the Sophoclean character of Philoctetes plays in Herder’s writings. By looking attentively at Herder’s arguments, and by reading them, quite rigorously but also very creatively, as a locus for an alternative theory of language in its relation to pain, Ferber destabilizes the two main assumptions regarding the contradictory and mutually exclusive relation between pain and language. Contrary to the usual paradigms regarding these questions, Herder locates pain at the very origin of language, not only for its immediate need to become vocal expression, but also, for its capacity therefore to call for an other (independently of whether the other is present) and thus for

¹ Los siguientes comentarios fueron leídos en una primera versión en el contexto de una discusión del libro de Ferber en el Workshop on Literature and Violence Sound and Violence, organizado por Andrea Potestá y Aicha Messina en París, Mayo 16 de 2019. A continuación, más que una reseña, las preguntas y discusiones que me surgieron en la lectura del libro de Ferber en conexión con mi propio trabajo sobre la escucha, junto con las respuestas de la autora.
inaugurating, in each case, a demand for community. Thus, instead of being the opposite of language, or the moment when language shatters and becomes mere noise, pain is at the center of a theory of language as expression, where language is not reduced to a mere instrument for communication, but is rather the site where communicability is made possible as such. And, instead of being an isolating experience, uncommunicable and thus completely inaccessible to any (human) other, pain is the call for, and in a way, the instantiation of a community with others, where what binds us is neither knowledge and clear understanding of each other’s intimate experiences, nor empathy as our capacity to project onto others our own feelings, but rather the acknowledgment of the suffering of another in the (in)comprehensible expression of their pain. Ferber goes to Heidegger and Cavell to reinforce the latter points, taking Herder’s original insights into a more developed and in-depth philosophical analysis of the kind of intimate community that is summoned through pain and made possible by our capacity to truly listen to it (“hearken” in Heidegger’s terminology), and the form of ethical acknowledgment pain calls for and inaugurates for us.

All this is being done while also performing something that I find fascinating in Ferber’s book: her own capacity to “listen” to the texts she is working with, and to let this listening guide us through key questions in the history of thought. Ferber’s attention to the character of Philoctetes in Sophocles’ play, and its various reenactments up to the present, allow us to “hear” something that is not exhausted by the philosophical analysis, and that stays throughout the book in Ferber’s accounts of the singularity of pain and its multiple expressions. The book, therefore, not only says but does, it not only analyzes carefully and slowly all the sides of a phenomenology of language that would have always been embedded in Herder’s essays and connects them in insightful ways to Heidegger and Cavell’s accounts. It also performs a hermeneutics of listening that allows for all these authors to resonate in a very original way in and through Ferber’s voice, while also calling for what I would like to call, perhaps provisionally here, an ethics of listening, that is, the responsibility that is shaped by and entailed in the other’s address when language does nothing but express pain and the need to be listened to, even if all this listening can do is to acknowledge there is perhaps nothing else to say.

In what follows, I would like to pose several questions that came to my mind while reading the book; questions that particularly arise at the intersection of Ferber’s book and my own work on listening. I think that our projects intersect in many places, challenging each other, making each other stronger, but also, perhaps, at some points, giving way to disagreements that I would like to explore together with Ferber further along the way.

First, key to Ferber’s project, and key to my own explorations on the question of language and memory after trauma, is the way that pain demands—and not only breaks—language. And here I would like to insist a bit more on the two paradoxical sides of this claim, as I find them equally important for any approach that attempts to take up the question of the
kinds of challenges that extreme forms of violence—in the case of my work—or extreme forms of pain—in the case of Ferber’s own terminology—pose to our conceptions of language and experience. In my work, I have insisted, like Ferber, on the capacity that specific experiences have of driving language to its breaking points, where words simply shatter and become mere expression, rather than communication, of an event that may not even properly be described as “event,” since its radically singular and unprecedented character has not only shattered language but the very same notion of experience that we usually rely on to elaborate and make sense of what happens to us in the world. In the case of some forms of experience, everything that is entailed in this statement—“elaborating” and “making sense,” happening “to us” and “in the world”—is radically disturbed and suddenly destroyed, in such a way that the world (and “us”) literally stop making sense altogether. The categories we used to rely on to signify and elaborate our experiences stop being adequate to contain what looks rather like a paradoxical encounter between an excess and an absence of sense (cf. Acosta 2019). There is simply too much that cannot be contained in language, there is also simply no word, no concept, that will suffice to represent the radicality of the experience. This paradox is for Ferber, as it is also for me, the beginning and not the end, of the story. She writes:

When pain encounters language it tears it apart, and in doing so, its essence is laid bare [...]. Pain’s uniqueness [...] reveals language’s innermost being [...] it does not work against language; instead, it realizes its inclination and drive to express and get language to work. (3)

I would like to attend here to a number of issues that I find essential to Ferber’s position, and I’ll try to distill the similarities and differences between my own emphasis and hers when it comes to attend to the problem at hand.

1. I agree entirely with Ferber that the shattering of language produced in the face of a radical experience of pain cannot be the end of language but rather the demand for a reconceptualization of language, beyond its representative function and its propositional structure. In these cases, Ferber argues, “pain encapsulates the very conditions of possibility of expression and language” (3). I also agree that this comes with the need for a “redefinition of our conceptions of experience as such,” one that has been opened “in ways that are not open to us otherwise, that is, without pain” (ibid.). And I agree all this needs to be done with enough care not to romanticize these forms of experience, since the truth they carry with them is not a call for their need, but rather a call for the need not to give up on making sense of them. I wonder, however, how far we want to go in insisting on these experiences to be the place where we actually locate the origin of language. Because it seems to me that, if such is the case, as singular as these experiences may be, they will become universal—universal to the extent that, in opening up another possibility of conceiving language altogether, they become the basis for a theory of language that needs then to go beyond these singularities to explain what language is as such—.
If I ask this question, is because I have also found it very difficult in my own work to sustain the two sides of the problem Ferber wants to sustain in her own approach: how not to renounce the possibility of language in the face of what is usually treated as its radical limit, and, thus, left to the realm of unintelligibility, while also keeping in mind the radically singular character of such an experience and its resistance to being universalized? That is, how to insist on the possibility of intelligibility without universalization? How to insist on the demand of communicability and share-ability (going to the literal meaning of Mitteilbarkeit in German) without operating already under the assumption of turning what is communicable into a universal or at least universalizable experience? I understand that Herder is interested in this universalization—and in turning pain into the experience that establishes our connection with one another, more than any other feeling, and that this tells us a lot too about language and what it means to be together in and through language. I also understand that this is a very important aspect of Ferber’s work since pain for her, rather than closing up our world to others, “has the power to completely open us to the possibility of sharing, participating, and reciprocating our pain with others” (13). Finally, I understand that this might come precisely out of the difference between dealing with something like “pain” and what I deal with, the question of “trauma,” that is narrower and needs to be treated perhaps with much more care to not banalize it by turning it into a universal—nonetheless communicable—experience. Still, I would like to hear more of what Ferber would have to say about this dilemma, and how she sees her own position—with and beyond Herder—in relation to this question.

2. Also perhaps in the same line of thought, I would like to pay attention to the kind of shattering taking place in the experience of pain. In my work, and with the help of authors Sigmund Freud and Walter Benjamin (and a sort of combined reading of the two as theorists of the breakdown of language in and by trauma), I have insisted that the shattering is not merely a loss of words—of our capacity to find the right words to represent or describe pain, for instance—but also a shattering of meaning altogether: in the face of trauma, the world has stopped making sense. It is not then just the acoustic, sonorous experience of expression without words, but also, the silences and fragmentations that occur in our expressions when, in attempting to tell a story, we do not and cannot make sense—and the kinds of challenges that come out of this experience of the shattering of meaning, as well as the kind of ethical demands that are here imposed on the listener (something that Ferber also emphasizes on) (cf. Acosta 2017). In Ferber’s analysis, this becomes the point where a reconceptualization of language is called for, where expression and not representation, become language’s original and most constitutive feature, and where silence and crying, as she puts it in the case of Philoctetes, “are inseparable on one another” (123). Thus, Ferber insists, on the one hand, in pain the sufferer is not “cut off from his or her ability to express” (id. 26). On the other hand, expression is now understood also in connection to a radically
somatic conception of language, where body and voice become one and meaning is no longer dependent on making sense.

I find this all very compelling and fascinating. It depends on a conception of meaning-making that is also entirely connected to the ways in which language constitutes and not only expresses our experience of the world. Experience is shaped by language, in such a way that any language is the result of our expression. Hence, when listening to others we should not expect them to “make sense,” rather, sense and meaning making will happen in the encounter between their sounds and our experience of listening to them, in the site opened up by the “environment of the event of saying,” as Ferber puts it quoting Wittgenstein (cf. 60), rather than in the actual words that are being pronounced or in the categories we have at hand to make sense of what is being said. If I am understanding this correctly—and I very much share the consequences this will have for what it means to listen to others, as I will also explain soon—I would like to know however what this means for understanding and communicating the shattering as such and the extents to which language has been shattered after radical experiences of pain and suffering. How is it possible to operate with language as expression in the face of the shattering of language (something I think Herder and Ferber’s reading address really well) and still have an experience of language as both communicability and being heard in one’s own pain, while also being able to express and thus to communicate the extent to which the world has been taken away from me, shattered to pieces in its previous given meanings, and become an unnamable, unrecognizable place? What happens to the shattering when language is reduced to—or can be reclaimed as—expression but no longer as representation? What happens to me in the face of such an isolating event where perhaps I am accompanied in my pain but not in an understanding of the kind of destruction that has taken place, namely the destruction of the who that feels—or no longer entirely feels—the pain? Where can one then claim for the need of a production of sense making that is not reduced—even if this is no little accomplishment—to the call for and expression of sympathy and acknowledgment?

Second, as mentioned above, Ferber’s reading of Herder, initially, and then of Heidegger and Cavell, among others, elicits an understanding of the language of pain as the beginning and not the end of community. Listening to the pain of others allows for a way of being together that comes with the very specific kind of summoning actualized by language as sound and, more importantly, as the expression of pain. This is as much a phenomenological as an ethical experience for Ferber. Going back to Herder, she shows how it is precisely the primacy of the acoustic that puts the sense of hearing at the center of an explanation of our becoming human. It is in listening to the pain of others, in recognizing someone else’s voice, and in the physical reaction of the musical strings of ears to the primal cry—and here the voice is and can be stripped from meaning making, it is just the guttural expression, and the singularity of what voice expresses on its own, even before “speaking”—that provokes sympathetic reverberations, a resonance and an attunement that happens both at
the level of the body and of the soul for Herder: “their nerves -Ferber quotes- come to a similar tension, their souls to a similar pitch” (49). Thus, our sense of hearing puts us “in touch” with one another, in an intimate yet non-violent form of closeness; an un-violent form of touch that nonetheless brings us closer together than the distance produced by seeing. Also, because of sound’s capacity for traveling and resounding, echoing and resonating, listening situates us in and within sound, different from the visual experience of merely facing one another. More than our capacity to express pain, it is actually our sense of hearing that brings us together, putting the ethical emphasis on the side of the listener and presenting the groundwork of a community constituted in and by the act of being summoned rather than in the need to communicate.

3. In this context, I would like to know more about how Ferber understands the ethical primacy of the experience of listening when it comes to thinking the sorts of challenges I was posing before with my previous questions. Like Ferber, I have also emphasized the ethical responsibility of the listener, rather than on the one trapped in the need and the impossibility of recounting their pain. In my work, this is tied to the responsibility of producing a site for the encounter where simply hearing the expression of pain is not enough, and where the silences and fragmented, shattered, forms of expression that are coming out of the kind of destruction of sense that has taken place in trauma are not merely acknowledged and given resonance to, but where bearing witness means also to listen and produce a grammar that will allow those “unintelligible” forms of communication to be rendered intelligible and thus believable (cf. Acosta 2019). This is all to avoid the same risk Ferber wants to avoid with her own approach: the risk of isolating even more the one who has already felt isolated in their pain. I would like to know how much of this is also part of what Ferber has in mind, and if this production of meaning in the encounter with the other is something that plays an important role in what she describes as the origin and constitution of community through the acoustic. That is, whether the acoustic here belongs to a realm of intelligibility or remains tied to a form of togetherness that is not yet connected to intelligibility, communication, understanding, and discursivity, and thus, not yet to a form of belonging that is grounded on what Ferber calls “the distribution of pain” in a shared realm (cf. 43), but also to the production and reconstitution of meaning after pain has been inflicted.

I realize too that my own questions are related to a form of pain that has been produced, inflicted, caused by another, rather than merely the result of a natural disposition we all share to be vulnerable and sensitive, sentient beings, capable and susceptible of feeling pain. I recognize therefore that my own questions are leading the discussion somewhere else, different from Ferber’s point of departure, and that, as I said before, speaking of trauma and of the kind of destruction of experience that it elicits in its survivors can be narrower, or perhaps even a very different kind than the pain Ferber is considering in her book. However, given that her discussion is also with authors like Elaine Scarry (cf. 1985), who are also preoccupied with forms of pain
that are induced –like that of torture for instance– and that I know Ferber has been dealing with these questions from different angles (cf. Ferber 2016), my questions are just trying to explore the connections she sees between this book and these other sides of her work, and whether a meditation on pain and language can also take us further on the possibilities of restoring community even in the face –or in the midst of the resonating, deafening sounds– of violence.

Bibliography

MARÍA DEL ROSARIO ACOSTA LÓPEZ
University of California - Riverside - Estados Unidos
mariadea@ucr.edu

Response of the author
Let me begin by thanking María del Rosario Acosta for her careful and thoughtful reading of Language Pangs: On Pain and the Origin of Language. Her comments touch on the heart of the book’s main arguments, but at the same time offer a fresh viewpoint on what I would call its moral implications. Since most of the book consists of close readings of Herder, Heidegger, and Sophocles, it is sometimes easy to lose sight of its core, namely, the relationship between language and pain that I think, in a broad sense, is ultimately a question about suffering and its relation, on the one hand to expression, and on the other, to a sense of a community. These are the issues that stand at the center of Acosta’s evocative response. Before I respond to her interpretation of the book in detail, however, let me say a few words of introduction about the book.²

Whether an all-consuming agony induced by violence or a mere passing headache, we have all experienced pain in one way or another and we all have some basic intuitions about it. We seem to know the suffering inherent to pain at first hand, we have felt its constraints and have all, to some extent, been lost for words in the face of its intensity. Pain seems to violently invade us with its invincible force, soon becoming the exclusive focus of our being. Pain becomes, almost unnoticeably, inseparable from us as it isolates us. But beyond the violence it exercises on our bodies and our souls, the experience of pain is also unique in its ability to interrupt, even block, our language. We tend to think of pain as an experience that cannot be fully expressed in language, something we can never entirely communicate or share with others. The experience of pain therefore fundamentally challenges our trust in language and its ability to express and

² My introduction is largely based on the first chapter of the book (cf. Ferber 2019 1-23).
communicate. This subversion of language does not only occur in the gap between the sufferer’s own feeling and words; it seems to institute a deep, unbridgeable divide between sufferer and world. This is why it appears to us that we always suffer alone: the totality with which pain isolates us is not only singular insofar as it encapsulates us; it also uniquely reconstitutes, perhaps even re-creates, the foundations of our relationship to everything else: self, body, world, and language. These intuitions we have about the experience of pain are interestingly reflected in two assumptions prevalent in the literature about pain. According to the first paradigm, pain is fundamentally characterized by its destructiveness; according to the second, pain is violently isolating, turning us into enclosed, solipsistic entities.

When we reflect on the two aforementioned paradigms, as they take apart pain into its destructive and isolating components, it is important to bear in mind that the understanding of pain these two paradigms yield is not only characterized by each trait separately, but also suggests something about an inseparability between them. For it is due to its fiercely destructive effect on our bodies as well as our language that pain isolates us, leaving us encapsulated in its non-linguistic, solipsistic realm. The two paradigms not only originate in the experience of pain, but they also fuel one another: there is no isolation without destruction, and vice versa. Moreover, this interdependency between the paradigms of pain is established via pain’s relations with language. In other words, any account of pain as destructive or isolating, even when it does not explicitly discuss language, necessarily implies a strong and incontestable linguistic presence. This paradigmatic account of pain subsequently results in a resolute separation between language and the experience of pain.

*Language Pangs* challenges these familiar conceptions of dissociation and mutual exclusion, as well as a reconsideration of the relationship between pain and language in terms of an essential interconnectedness. The premise of the book is both that we cannot truly penetrate the experience of pain without taking account of its relation to language; and also that the nature of language essentially depends on our understanding of its relationship with pain. I question the assumption that the experience of pain limits our linguistic abilities, neutralizing us as linguistic beings. On the contrary, the exploration of the nature and origins of language reveals a very strong kinship to pain. It is therefore necessary to shift away from characterizing this relationship in terms of essential rivalry and opposition and turn toward a notion of inherent interconnection and profound intimacy between pain and language—an abiding intimacy—. Although it might be irrefutable that, in states of extreme pain, language seems to crumble or collapse, depriving us of words, treating such experiences as paradigmatic is problematic and partial distorting the way that pain and language are conceptualized and defined in the first place.

The book approaches these questions through the lens of Johann Gottfried Herder’s *Treatise on the Origin of language* (1772) being, as I take it, the first philosophical account to bring together language and pain by establishing the cry
of pain as nothing less than the origin of language. Herder not only emphasizes the cry of pain but also the important role of hearing; both cry and hearing constitute the beginning of language creating a space where pain is not an independent pre-linguistic event or content, but rather takes part in language’s very substratum. Consequently, the origin of language is, according to Herder, not about speech, communication, or mediation (as the contemporaneous Enlightenment theories would have it); but rather, about pain’s immediate expression in a cry and the immediacy with which we hear and feel the pain of others. With these arguments, Herder provides a consequential challenge to theories of pain whose focus is the unbridgeable gap between our feeling and knowledge of our own pain and the pain of others.3

In her commentary, Acosta is asking “how far we want to go in insisting on these experiences to be the place where we actually locate the origin of language?” According to her, by locating my discussion of pain in the context of Herder’s account of the origin of language, I in fact suggest that

as singular as these experiences [of pain] may be, they will become universal—universal to the extent that, in opening up another possibility of conceiving language altogether, they become the basis of a theory of language that needs then to go beyond these singularities to explain what language is as such.

This is a problem that arises when we take into account her own work, namely, pain that is not only about the universal, shared forms of our existence—linguistic or otherwise—but rather, about the most extreme limits of everything imaginable—not only suffering itself, but also the violent circumstances that brought it about—. In this context, Acosta problematizes the encounter between the singular character of the experience of suffering and the philosophical demand to think of it in universal terms (otherwise, our discussion will be limited to the psychological account of suffering and its implications). As she puts it: “How to insist on the demand of communicability and share-ability (going to the literal meaning of Mitteilbarkeit in German) without operating already under the assumption of turning what is communicable into a universal or at least universalizable experience?”

My response to this important question has to do, in many ways, with my understanding and reading of Herder. As mentioned above, although most of the book is devoted to close readings of Herder and his resonance in Heidegger or Sophocles, the book is not about him. It is about the experience of pain and its effect on language. I say my “understanding” of Herder precisely because I am not, strictly speaking, a Herder scholar, that I believe I can identify arguments in his work whose implications lie much further than being those of an eighteenth-century thinker (however radical). Although Herder tries to write on something as “universal” as language, he actually touches on what is most singular. Moreover, perhaps it is this singularity that serves as basis to

3 There are two other figures central to the book and to my discussion of these issue: Martin Heidegger to whom chapter 4 is devoted, and Sophocles’ Philoctetes, which is the center of chapter 5.
our ability to think the universal and not the other way around, as we are accustomed to thinking. This is how bodily pain comes to be the birth of language: the singular and extreme is the only thing that can serve as the beginning of the universal. The utmost, shattering privacy, becomes something we all share. Taking this from Herder into the context of Acosta’s work with Colombia’s Historical Memory Center, and her current work now with survivors of police torture in Chicago, I would say that the importance of this project has to do not only with the collection of testimonies from individuals who have suffered the greatest of pains, but also with the philosophical significance of the structure of suffering and its implications. This is where the singular comes together with the universal in a striking manner.

I think that this is what brings the book very close to Acosta’s work. If those cases of terrible, unimaginable violence and suffering were only extreme cases, that is, cases that do not reflect what we share as human beings, they would not have been so important. This is, indeed, the very philosophical force extreme pain has, so I believe. In Acosta’s work as well as in my own, the extreme draws together, the singular shapes the universal. (I would like to add here that there is one crucial difference between her work on trauma and memory and my own work on pain: in the case of victims of violence, there is a fundamental presence of a perpetrator (regardless the question whether or not he or she are identified). Namely, the problem of the infliction of pain by the other is essential. In my work on pain the role of the perpetrator is minor and appears only in my discussion of the figure of Philoctetes from the Sophoclean drama of the same name (see also the last part of Acosta’s response).

We could say, and here I continue to address more points Acosta raises, that pain and violence constitute a community and that listening to the pains of others bring us close to them, thereby constituting a shared space. That even though we can never truly ‘understand’ the pain of other (as Elaine Scarry has famously argued) we could still be empathetic towards it, turn toward the suffering other. This is all true, but from my perspective, not enough.4 I would say that the communal element here, what we can call the “universal”, has to do with what pain exposes not only in its victim, but in us. By listening we not only place ourselves beside the sufferer, caress her and try to help by (at least) empathizing. I would like to suggest something more far reaching, that again, I think is present in both our works: namely, that the pain of others is always also our own pain, namely, that it belongs to a world we share and thus that we are responsible for it (otherwise my project would remain within the boundaries of psychology and not have philosophical significance).

Acosta addresses such implication of the experience of suffering on our being with others, in her writings on Jean-Luc Nancy’s idea of the “inoperative community” (cf. Acosta 2017). The community is made out of finite individuals surrounded by their own limits, and since “the fulfillment of individuality is,………

4 Elaine Scarry’s prominent The Body in Pain (1985), plays a significant role in the crystallization of the two paradigms. See my criticism of Scarry in Language Pangs, especially pp. 8-11.
precisely, the negation of community and relation altogether”, the community is doomed to inoperativeness (id. 24). Here, Acosta emphasizes Nancy’s important idea of community not as a space to be regained or lost but rather as what “is given to us with being and as being” (id. 35). In this context, Acosta discusses the “law” of the community (developed through her reading of Kant), and its relation to the innermost structure of our being with others. She argues that community is established on a demand, however, without being able to command (it would be interesting to think of Heidegger’s “Call of conscience” here (cf. Ferber 2019 111-116). There are different ways to understand this argument, I would here suggest one: community has to do with the “task” of hearing the summoning of communal life, and this is in the context of my own work in cases of the expression of suffering.

This relates to one of the most important arguments of the book, that has to do with what we take to be the destructive nature of pain. If we consider the experience of pain solely from the perspective of those who are suffering, we may be left with broken words and the collapse of our communicative capabilities. But the problematics inherent to the encounter between pain and language extend beyond the sufferer’s own body or speech, pertaining equally to those who witness the suffering of others. We all –not only those in pain– bear responsibility for the inexpressibility of pain. Every broken cry calls upon us, demands something from us, and has the potential to move us (here, Nancy’s demand rather than command is suggestive). This is another one of pain’s distinct attributes: even when not spoken clearly or accurately defined, even when cried or moaned with the faintest breath, pain permeates us, stakes a claim on us –not only on those who suffer, but most of all, on those who do not–.

In my work on Jean Améry (cf. Ferber 2016), this claim plays an important role. One of my challenges there is to show that, precisely because Améry insists on the solitude forced on him by the violence he has suffered, he cannot avoid speaking about a “world” –the world is open or closed to him, the world is familiar but still alien, and finally, his famous phrase that he will never again ‘feel at home in the world’–. What I am interested in here (besides the important relation to Heidegger’s being-in-the-world), is the fact that insofar as it is a world that we are speaking of (and it is always about a world), it is one shared with us. It is not only Améry’s space of suffering. In that sense, we take part in his pain –but in the strong sense, we are actually in pain–. Even if this pain is not inflicted on our bodies, we share the same world where these events have happened (and I think that here Language Pangs comes very close to Acosta’s work).

It is interesting to note here that for Herder, the sphere where this primordial sympathy appears is that of nature rather than an intersubjective human realm. This idea corresponds directly with Acosta’s work on Schiller, specifically her reading of his Aesthetic Letters, where Schiller asks “How can we, however laudable our precepts, how can we be just, kindly, and human toward others, if we lack the power of receiving into ourselves, faithfully and truly, natures unlike ours, of feeling our way into the situation of others, of making other people’s feelings
our own?" (cit. Acosta 2011 193, emphasis added). About this she says:

This is the same notion of sympathy or compassion [Mitleid] –a kind of ‘feeling with others’ – that will be carefully developed two years later in relation to the notion of the ‘pathetic sublime’. Schiller will show then how it is only through our relationship to another human being’s suffering, that is, how it is only in ‘making other people’s feelings our own,’ that we first discover our own ultimate possibility: our power to be free. (id. 194)

The importance of Acosta’s emphasis is double. First, for Schiller, just like in Herder, “feeling-with” has to do with the encounter between man and nature, rather than between two subjects. Second, and more importantly, Acosta establishes a link between “feeling-with” and freedom, namely, the sympathy with the pain of others, that marks not only a kind of moral conduct, but foremost, something of our own freedom as singular human beings.

And perhaps it is pain that has the unique role of creating such a space for us, a shared space. This is also related to another of Acosta’s questions, particularly, the problem of the fundamental shattering not only of our bodies and language, but also “a shattering of meaning altogether: in the face of trauma, the world has stopped making sense”. This is something Acosta emphasizes in her response –and rightly so. It is important because “making sense” does not happen immediately for its own sake. It is always about a relation. Cases of extreme pain caused by violence are important precisely because there is no possibility of maintaining a relation at all (if we allude to Heidegger again, it would be something like what he calls the “non-relational”), especially in the case of meaning. It is here, Acosta writes, that the world stops making sense. But, again, this is the world that we share with the victims. It is also our world that has now lost its meaning. This is, again, a central argument in my work on Améry. Herder makes an interesting move in this context, he emphasizes sound, especially the “musical strings” metaphor. He does not merely describe a world where sounds resonate (touching or not the heart of another) but, more importantly, a world –a space that is created– constituted in the first place by these sounds. There is no space, no world, that is not a space of resonance (Acosta addresses this in the context of the question of expression).

This brings me to the last points Acosta raises when she elaborates on the sense of hearing, that stands at the center of the book (apart from Herder, also in the discussions of Heidegger and Sophocles).

More than our capacity to express pain, [she writes] it is actually our sense of hearing that brings us together, putting the ethical emphasis on the side of the listener, and presenting the groundwork of a community constituted in and by the act of being summoned rather than in the need to communicate.

This claim occupies a central role in Acosta’s current research on Grammars of Listening. There, Acosta uses the structure of listening as the substratum of trauma and its implications touching not only on the question of suffering and the sufferer, but also and foremost on the ethical role of listening to the pain of others. Insofar as the context of trauma is concerned, for
This brings me back to Language Pangs and to Herder’s treatise on language. For Herder, the origin of language is, contrary to our intuitions, not about speech at all, not communication or an expression aimed at the satisfaction of needs (as Locke, his predecessor, thought of it). Herder speaks of hearing as the moment of language’s birth, namely, it is when we hear, when sound penetrates us, that we become linguistic beings. It is not about us, but about listening to others. However, for Herder such listening is a listening to the cry of pain—the sound suffering makes. This is why the relation between pain and language is not (or not only) about the ability or inability to speak our pains, to describe them. But rather, the important, deep ways whither being able to hear one another constitutes our language, our world, and our ethical conduct. It is therefore not only the birth of language, but its birth pangs: thereby, language pangs.

Bibliography


ILIT FERBER
Tel-Aviv University - Ramat Aviv - Israel
iferber@tauex.tau.ac.il