La unidad del escepticismo humeano
The Unity of Hume’s Skepticism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v72n10Supl.111011Palabras clave:
D. Hume, escepticismo, naturalismo, asociación de ideas, copia, separabilidad (es)skepticism, naturalism, principle of association of ideas, principle of copying, principle of separability (en)
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Los intérpretes han dividido la filosofía de Hume, su “lógica”, en dos partes: la destructiva, compuesta por sus análisis filosóficos, su crítica del racionalismo y sus momentos escépticos; la constructiva, que contiene su asociacionismo psicológico, su ciencia empírica de la naturaleza humana y sus momentos naturalistas o realistas. Mi intención es cuestionar cualquier interpretación que suponga esa dicotomía, y mostrar que Hume realiza ambas tareas al mismo tiempo, en etapas sucesivas. Muestro la unidad de su filosofía en tres tópicos: un examen de la articulación entre el principio de la copia y los principios de asociación; un análisis de la estructura de los argumentos de Hume una crítica de los supuestos momentos escéptico y naturalista.
The interpreters divided Hume's philosophy, his "logic," into two parts: the destructive part would be composed of his philosophical analyses, his critique of rationalism, and his skeptical moments; the constructive part would contain its psychological associationism, its empirical science of human nature, and its naturalistic or realistic moments. My intention is to question any interpretation that involves that two-part dichotomy and instead suggest that Hume performs both tasks at the same time, in successive stages. I show the unity of his philosophy in three topics: an examination of the articulation between the principle of copying and the principles of association; a demonstration of how Hume performs different tasks in two distinct stages, one negative and one positive; and a critique of the supposed skeptical and naturalistic moments.
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