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2013-01-01

Probability-Lowering Causes and the Connotations of Causation

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D. H. Mellor, causation, probabilism. (es)

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Autores/as

  • Andrés Páez Universidad de los Andes-Colombia
A common objection to probabilistic theories of causation is that there are prima facie causes that lower the probability of their effects. Among the many replies to this objection, little attention has been given to Mellor’s (1995) indirect strategy to deny that probability-lowering factors are bona fide causes. According to Mellor, such factors do not satisfy the evidential, explanatory, and instrumental connotations of causation. The paper argues that the evidential connotation only entails an epistemically relativized form of causal attribution, not causation itself, and that there are clear cases of explanation and instrumental reasoning that must appeal to negatively relevant factors. In the end, it suggests a more liberal interpretation of causation that restores its connotations.

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Páez, Andrés. «Probability-Lowering Causes and the Connotations of Causation». Ideas Y Valores, vol. 62, n.º 151, enero de 2013, pp. 43-55, https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/30716.

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