Publicado

2009-09-01

Demotivating Semi-Compatibilism

Palabras clave:

John Martin Fischer, semi-compatibilism, motivation, free will, resilience, luck (es)

Descargas

Autores/as

  • Kevin Timpe
In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind John Martin Fischer's semi-compatibilism. Particularly, I look at three reasons Fischer gives for preferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the first two of these motivations are in tension with each other: the more one is moved by the first motivation, the less one can appeal to the second, and vice versa. I then argue that Fischer's third motivation ought not move anyone to prefer Fischer's semi-compatibilist picture to any of the leading contemporary libertarian theories. Finally, I make some methodological comments about the role intuitions play in Fischer's project.

Referencias

Baer, J. "Free Will Requires Determinism". Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will, Baer, J., Kaufman, J. C. & Baumeister, R. F., eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 304-310.

Coffman, E. J. "Thinking about Luck", Synthese 158/3 (2007): 385-398.

Fischer, J. M. & Ravizza, M. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Fischer, J. M. "Recent Work on Moral Responsibility", Ethics 110 (1999): 93-139.

Fischer, J. M. "Problems with Actual-Sequence Incompatibilism", The Journal of Ethics 4 (2000): 323-328.

Fischer, J. M. "Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism". The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Kane, R., ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 281-308.

Fischer, J. M. "The Cards that are Dealt You", The Journal of Ethics 10 (2006a): 107-129.

Fischer, J. M. My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006b.

Fischer, J. M. "Compatibilism". Four Views on Free Will. Fischer, J. M., Kane, R., Pereboom, D. & Vargas, M., eds. Malden: Blackwell, 2007. 44-84.

Fischer, J. M. "My Way and Life's Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and Perry", Ethics 12 (2008a): 167-189.

Fischer, J. M. "Review: Alfred R. Mele: Free Will and Luck", Mind 117 (2008b): 195-201.

Hobart, R. E. "Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable Without It", Mind 43 (1934): 1-27.

Kane, R. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Kane, R. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Lackey, J. "What Luck is Not", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86/2 (2008): 255-267. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t 713659165~db=all~tab=issueslist~branches=86 - v86.

McKenna, M. "Reasons Reactivity and Incompatibilist Intuitions", Philosophical Explorations 8 (2005): 131-143.

Mele, A. "Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will", The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Kane, R., ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 529-548.

Mele, A. Free Will and Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Moya, C. Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Skepticism. New York: Blackwell, 2006.

O'Connor, T. "Freedom with a Human Face", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005): 207-227.

Pereboom, D. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Rowe, W. "Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Problem of 'Oomph'", The Journal of Ethics 10 (2006): 295-313.

Speak, D. "Guest Editor's Introduction: Leading the Way", The Journal of Ethics 12 (2008): 123-128.

Steward, H. "Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer's Semi-compatibilism vs. Anti-foundationalism", The Journal of Ethics 12 (2008): 129-145.

Strawson, G. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility", Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 5-24.

Timpe, K. Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives. London: Continuum, 2008.

van Inwagen, P. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.

van Inwagen, P. "van Inwagen on Free Will". Freedom and Determinism. Campbell, J. K., O'Rourke, M. & Shier, D., eds. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 213-230.

van Inwagen, P. "How to Think about the Free Will Problem", The Journal of Ethics (forthcoming).

Vargas, M. "The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility", Philosophical Studies 125 (2005): 399-429.

Vargas, M. "Revisionism". Four Views on Free Will. Fischer, J.M, Kane, R., Pereboom, D. & Vargas, M. Malden: Blackwell, 2007a. 126-165.

Vargas, M. "Response to Kane, Fischer, and Pereboom". Four Views on Free Will. Fischer, J. M., Kane, R., Pereboom, D. & Vargas, M. Malden: Blackwell, 2007b. 204-219.

Visitas a la página del resumen del artículo

301

Descargas

Los datos de descarga aún no están disponibles.

Cómo citar

“Demotivating Semi-Compatibilism”. Ideas Y Valores, vol. 58, no. 141, Sept. 2009, pp. 109-24, https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/36256.

Licencia

Derechos de autor 2016 Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.

De acuerdo con la Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-No Comercial-SinDerivar 4.0 Internacional. Se autoriza copiar, redistribuir el material en cualquier medio o formato, siempre y cuando se conceda el crédito a los autores de los textos y a Ideas y Valores como fuente de publicación original. No se permite el uso comercial de copia o distribución de contenidos, así como tampoco la adaptación, derivación o transformación alguna de estos sin la autorización previa de los autores y de la dirección de Ideas y Valores. Para mayor información sobre los términos de esta licencia puede consultar: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.