Publicado

2013-05-01

E-Phisicalism - A Phisicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

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Autores/as

  • Reinaldo Bernal ICFES - Universidad Externado de Colombia
  • Pierre Jacob
  • Maximilian Kistler
  • David Papineau
  • Jérôme Dokic
El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de la conciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva –en el sentido de Nagel (1974)– es un fenómeno real, y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.

Referencias

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Papineau, D. "Must a Physicalist be a Microphysicalist?" Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Kallestrup, J. & Hohwy, J. (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 126-148.

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Cómo citar

“E-Phisicalism - A Phisicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness”. Ideas Y Valores, vol. 62, no. 152, May 2013, pp. 267-9, https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/39951.