Publicado

2017-01-01

¿Soluciona el descriptivismo causal el problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos?

Does Causal Descriptivism Solve the Problem of Reference of Theoretical Terms?

Palabras clave:

S. Psillos, descriptivismo causal, oración de Ramsey, realismo científico, términos teóricos (es)
S. Psillos, causal descriptivism, Ramsey sentences, scientific realism, theoretical terms (en)

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Autores/as

  • Bruno Borge Universidad de Buenos Aires - Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica
Las teorías de la referencia puramente descriptivistas o causales fracasan a la hora de dar cuenta del modo en que se fija y puede rastrearse la referencia de los términos teóricos. Psillos propuso dos versiones del descriptivismo causal que recogen argu-mentos presentes en defensas previas de dicha posición. Se trata de una teoría mixta que pretende solucionar el problema y acomodarse a intuiciones presentes en enfo-ques alternativos, como el que apela a oraciones de Ramsey. El artículo se propone mostrar la insuficiencia del descriptivismo causal como solución al problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos.
Purely descriptivist or purely causal reference theories fail to account for the manner in which the reference of theoretical terms is fixed and can be traced. S. Psillos proposed two versions of causal descriptivism that take up arguments set forth in previous defenses of said position. His is a mixed theory that attempts to solve the problem by adopting insights from alternative approaches, such as those that resort to Ramsey sentences. The objective of the article is to show the insufficiency of causal descriptivism as a solution to the problem of reference of theoretical terms.

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