Publicado

2018-01-01

Kant on Free Will and Theoretical Rationality

Libre albedrío y racionalidad teórica en Kant

Palabras clave:

Kant, free will, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, theoretical rationality (en)
Kant, libre albedrío, Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres, racionalidad teórica (es)

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Autores/as

  • Daniel Wolt Universidade de São Paulo
The focus of this essay is Kant’s argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) III that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. After setting out  an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go (§§1-2), I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding oneself as free is incompatible with accepting universal causal determinism (§3). However, I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that regarding oneself as rational is inconsistent with accepting universal causal determinism if one accepts a certain, plausible view of the explanation of events (§4).
El ensayo se enfoca en el argumento de Kant en la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres (gms) iii según el cual considerarse racional implica verse a uno mismo como libre. Se interpreta la forma en que debe entenderse el argumento (§§1-2) y se afirma que Kant no logra demostrar que considerarse libre es incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal (§3). No obstante, se sugiere
que el argumento sí logra demostrar que considerarse a uno mismo como racional es incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal, si se acepta una cierta versión plausible de la explicación de los eventos (§4).

Referencias

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