Publicado

2017-10-15

¿Cómo entender los fenómenos de pasividad? Una revisión crítica de la hipótesis de Frith

How to understand Delusions of control? A critical review of Frith’s hypothesis

Palabras clave:

C. D. Frith, conciencia de movimiento, control motor, esquizofrenia, fenómenos de pasividad, movimiento voluntario, sentido de agencia (es)
C. D. Frith, movement awareness, motor control, schizophrenia, delusions of control, voluntary movement, sense of agency (en)

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Autores/as

  • Camilo Sánchez Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Desde 1980, C. D. Frith ha venido investigando sobre la esquizofrenia, explicando síntomas centrales como las alucinaciones, con miras a aclarar cuál es el déficit de base y originario de este trastorno mental. A lo largo de estos años, Frith ha propuesto su hipótesis centrada en el concepto de consciencia, y ha venido elaborándola como parte del desarrollo científico contemporáneo: parte de la aplicación de modelos neurocognitivos de control motor, según los cuales el déficit se atribuye al concepto de copia eferente y su función, luego la actualiza y complementa con evidencia de imagen cerebral de la atenuación de la actividad cortical parietal, como efecto derivado de la copia eferente; por último, adiciona el concepto de sentido de agencia, y el componente de cognición social, intentando integrar la experiencia del paciente y la relevancia del ámbito inter-subjetivo a su propuesta, ambos aspectos recientemente populares.  

Since 1980, C. D. Frith has been working on schizophrenia, and explaining central symptoms such as hallucinations, in an attempt to clarify the basic deficits of this mental disorder. Frith has put forth a hypothesis based on the concept of consciousness, and has been adjusting it alongside contemporary scientific developments. In
first place, it begins with the use of neurocognitive models of motor control, according to which the deficit is attributable to the concept of efferent copy and its function. In second place, he updated the model by including neuroimaging evidence of attenuation in parietal activity, as a consequence of the efferent copy. In third place, he added the concept of sense of agency, and the social cognition component, trying to integrate to his proposal the patient’s experience and the relevance of the intersubjective aspect. The current paper, which critically reviews Frith’s hypothesis, it’s divided in four parts: First, the hypothesis’ evolution is synthesized; second, the main arguments are summarized; third, the main critical points are presented; and,
finally, some general conclusions are drawn.

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Citas

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