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El voto electrónico y retos criptográficos relacionados
Electronic voting and related cryptographic challenges
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https://doi.org/10.15446/rev.fac.cienc.v4n2.51677Palabras clave:
Voto electrónico, criptografía (es)Electronic voting, cryptography (en)
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Referencias
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1. Kevin Adiel Lajpop Ajpacajá. (2022). Voto Electrónico con “Blockchain”: La Unión entre la Tecnología y Sociedad. Revista Científica del Sistema de Estudios de Postgrado de la Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 4(1), p.85. https://doi.org/10.36958/sep.v4i1.79.
2. Carlos Mario Molina Betancur, Sergio Orlando Silva Arroyave. (2021). La democracia electrónica en Colombia. Vniversitas, 70 https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.vj70.deco.
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