POLÍTICAS DE SEGURIDAD CONTRA EL NARCOTRÁFICO: MÉXICO, BRASIL Y COLOMBIA

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2016-01-01

POLÍTICAS DE SEGURIDAD CONTRA EL NARCOTRÁFICO: MÉXICO, BRASIL Y COLOMBIA

Palabras clave:

Narcotráfico, Seguridad, Drogas, Colombia, México, Brasil (es)
Drug trafficking, Security, Drugs, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil (en)

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Autores/as

Fernando Estrada Universidad Industrial de Santander
Fabio Fernando Moscoso Durán Universidad EAN
Nelson A. Andrade Valbuena Universidad EAN

Resumen (es)
Resumen (en)

Durante la década anterior la criminalidad organizada incrementó considerablemente la violencia contra los estados del norte en México, si se le compara con la relativa disminución en Brasil y Colombia. ¿Por qué difieren las políticas de seguridad al intentar reducir la violencia causada por el narcotráfico? ¿Repite México los mismos fenómenos de violencia que Colombia durante los años 90? ¿Qué diferencia los modelos de seguridad en Rio y la política de contención implementada en Medellín durante el gobierno del presidente Uribe? El análisis de la violencia criminal como subtipo de las guerras civiles provee pocas herramientas dadas las diferencias entre las organizaciones de la mafia y agrupaciones insurgentes. En este artículo se sustenta que los carteles de las drogas no luchan exclusivamente por territorio o por el control del poder político, sino que entre sus objetivos está condicionar a los actores estatales a trabajar por ellos. El medio preferido por los carteles de las drogas es la corrupción –amenazando funcionarios o sobornándolos. Nuestra lectura permite observar que una mayor represión incrementa los precios del soborno y promueve la guerra entre los mismos carteles, siempre que se cumplan dos condiciones (a) que la corrupción sea generalizada, y (b) que la represión obligue a los carteles a tomar retaliaciones como venganza. Analizar los cambios en las políticas de seguridad contribuye a explicar las diferencias entre los mismos carteles.

Over the past decade, organized crime greatly increases the violence against the northern states in Mexico, if compared with the relative decline in Brazil and Colombia. Why different security policies to try to reduce the violence caused by drug trafficking? Mexico repeats the same phenomena of violence that Colombia during the 90’s? What difference security models in Rio and the containment policy implemented in Medellin during the government of President Uribe? The analysis of criminal violence and civil wars subtype provides few tools given the differences between mafia organizations and insurgent groups. This article is based on the proposal that drug cartels are fighting not only by territory or for control of political power, but that its objectives are conditional state actors to work for them. The preferred by drug cartels medium is -threatening corruption or bribing officials. Our reading can observe that greater repression increases prices of bribery and promotes war between the cartels themselves, provided that two conditions are met (a) that corruption is widespread, and (b) requiring the cartels repression taking retaliation and revenge. Analyze changes in security policies helps explain the differences between them posters.

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