Publicado

2015-07-01

Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment

¿Por qué cumplimos nuestras promesas? Un panorama del compromiso estratégico

Por que cumprimos as nossas promessas? Uma visão do compromisso estratégico

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15446/cuad.econ.v34n65.40511

Palabras clave:

Strategic commitment, economic rationality, pro-sociality, cooperation, social dilemmas (en)
compromiso estratégico, racionalidad económica, pro‑socialidad, cooperación, dilemas sociales. (es)
Compromisso estratégico, racionalidade econômica, prossocialidade, cooperação, dilemas sociais (pt)

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Autores/as

  • Miranda Del Corral Universidad de Buenos Aires - Facultad de Filosofía - Departamento de Filosofía
Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment has succeeded, it is no longer in the agent's self interest to fulfil her commitment. Why, then, do people keep their promises (and threats)? This paper reviews the literature concerning the problem of commitment within the scope of pro-sociality and cooperation, and examines two mechanisms that enable credibility and trust: reputation and social emotions.
Los compromisos estratégicos, tales como las promesas y las amenazas, son problemáticos para el modelo clásico de racionalidad económica: solo surgen cuando existe un incentivo para gorronear, necesitan ser creíbles para manipular el comportamiento de los demás, y una vez que esto sucede, su cumplimiento no es la mejor opción para el agente. ¿Por qué, entonces, cumple la gente sus promesas y amenazas? Este artículo ofrece una revisión bibliográfica del problema del compromiso desde la perspectiva de la prosocialidad y la cooperación, relacionándolo con la capacidad de la reputación y de las emociones sociales de generar credibilidad y confianza.
Os compromissos estratégicos, tais como as promessas e as ameaças, são problemáticos para o modelo clássico de racionalidade econômica: somente surgem quando existe um incentivo para se aproveitar e filar; precisam ser críveis para manipular o comportamento dos outros e, uma vez que isto acontece, o seu cumprimento não é a melhor opção para o agente. Por que, então, as pessoas cumprem as suas promessas e ameaças? Este artigo oferece uma revisão bibliográfica do problema do compromisso da perspectiva da prossocialidade e a cooperação, relacionando-o com a capacidade da reputação e das emoções sociais de gerar credibilidade e confiança.

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Del Corral, M. (2015). ¿Por qué cumplimos nuestras promesas? Un panorama del compromiso estratégico. Cuadernos De Economía, 34(65), 237-259. https://doi.org/10.15446/cuad.econ.v34n65.40511