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Tras el laberinto humeano: una concepción material de la inducción sin tesis ontológica
After the Humean Labyrinth: A Material Conception of Induction without Ontological Theses
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v72n182.84589Keywords:
Norton, Inducción, Justificación epistémica, Problema de Hume (es)Norton, Induction, Epistemic justification, Hume's Problem (en)
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En este artículo defiendo que el problema humeano de la justificación racional de la inducción no ha contribuido a la comprensión filosófica de este tipo de inferencias. La teoría material de la inducción propuesta por Norton (2003) permite analizar el razonamiento inductivo más allá del laberinto justificativo humeano, pero con un corte demasiado alto: asumir que las inducciones dependen intrínsecamente de cómo es localmente la realidad. En su lugar, propongo una teoría de la inducción en la que las inducciones dependen no de tesis ontológicas, sino de las capacidades cognitivas para comprimir información de un modo epistémicamente efectivo.
In this article I argue that the Humean problem of rational justification induction has not contributed to the philosophical understanding of this type of inference. The material theory of induction proposed by Norton (2003) allows us to analyze inductive reasoning beyond the Humean justificatory labyrinth, but with a higher cut: assuming that inductions intrinsically depend on how reality is locally. Instead, I will propose a theory of induction in which inductions depend not on ontological theses, but on cognitive capacities to compress information in an epistemically effective way.
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