Publicado

2024-09-23

Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games

Transparencia y castigo altruista en un modelo experimental de cooperación a la corrupción a través de juegos económicos

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15446/rcp.v33n2.103188

Palabras clave:

corruption, signaling, descriptive norms, altruistic punishment, transparency (en)
corrupción, señalización, normas descriptivas, castigo altruista, transparencia (es)

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Autores/as

This work integrates cooperation, punishment, damage to the treasury, and the transgression of norms in a single experimental model of corruption. Participants formed words with predetermined letters, receiving a reward for each word, and, if they reached a goal, an extra taken from the common fund. Manipulation in the letters made it impossible to reach the goal, so reporting exceeding it implied cheating for a benefit. Three studies model the effects of signaling, descriptive norms, and the possibility of punishing or investigating (transparency) corruption acts. 248 participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of each study. Significant differences were found in reports of words and earnings in Studies 1 and 3, but not in Study 2. The experimental model reveals the potential of transparency as an alternative of lower social cost than altruistic punishment to diminish corruption. The relevance of these results for implementing public policies was discussed.

Este trabajo integra la cooperación, el castigo, el daño al erario y la transgresión de las normas en un mismo modelo experimental de corrupción. Los participantes formaban palabras con letras predeterminadas, recibiendo una recompensa por cada palabra y, si alcanzaban una meta, un extra tomado del fondo común. Una manipulación en las letras hacía imposible alcanzar la meta, por lo que reportar alcanzarla implicaba hacer trampa para beneficiarse. Se realizaron tres estudios, modelando los efectos de la señalización, las normas descriptivas y la posibilidad de sancionar o investigar (transparencia) los actos de corrupción. 248 participantes fueron asignados aleatoriamente a las condiciones de cada estudio. Se encontraron diferencias significativas en los reportes de palabras y ganancias en los estudios 1 y 3, pero no en el estudio 2. El modelo experimental revela el potencial de la transparencia como una alternativa de menor costo social que el castigo altruista para disminuir la corrupción. Se discute la relevancia de estos resultados para la implementación de políticas públicas.

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Cómo citar

APA

Duarte-Barroso, J. J. y Cruz Torres, C. E. (2024). Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games. Revista Colombiana de Psicología, 33(2), 43–62. https://doi.org/10.15446/rcp.v33n2.103188

ACM

[1]
Duarte-Barroso, J.J. y Cruz Torres, C.E. 2024. Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games. Revista Colombiana de Psicología. 33, 2 (sep. 2024), 43–62. DOI:https://doi.org/10.15446/rcp.v33n2.103188.

ACS

(1)
Duarte-Barroso, J. J.; Cruz Torres, C. E. Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games. Rev. colomb. psicol. 2024, 33, 43-62.

ABNT

DUARTE-BARROSO, J. J.; CRUZ TORRES, C. E. Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games. Revista Colombiana de Psicología, [S. l.], v. 33, n. 2, p. 43–62, 2024. DOI: 10.15446/rcp.v33n2.103188. Disponível em: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/psicologia/article/view/103188. Acesso em: 11 oct. 2024.

Chicago

Duarte-Barroso, Juan José, y Christian Enrique Cruz Torres. 2024. «Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games». Revista Colombiana De Psicología 33 (2):43-62. https://doi.org/10.15446/rcp.v33n2.103188.

Harvard

Duarte-Barroso, J. J. y Cruz Torres, C. E. (2024) «Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games», Revista Colombiana de Psicología, 33(2), pp. 43–62. doi: 10.15446/rcp.v33n2.103188.

IEEE

[1]
J. J. Duarte-Barroso y C. E. Cruz Torres, «Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games», Rev. colomb. psicol., vol. 33, n.º 2, pp. 43–62, sep. 2024.

MLA

Duarte-Barroso, J. J., y C. E. Cruz Torres. «Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games». Revista Colombiana de Psicología, vol. 33, n.º 2, septiembre de 2024, pp. 43-62, doi:10.15446/rcp.v33n2.103188.

Turabian

Duarte-Barroso, Juan José, y Christian Enrique Cruz Torres. «Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games». Revista Colombiana de Psicología 33, no. 2 (septiembre 30, 2024): 43–62. Accedido octubre 11, 2024. https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/psicologia/article/view/103188.

Vancouver

1.
Duarte-Barroso JJ, Cruz Torres CE. Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games. Rev. colomb. psicol. [Internet]. 30 de septiembre de 2024 [citado 11 de octubre de 2024];33(2):43-62. Disponible en: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/psicologia/article/view/103188

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