Publicado

2017-01-01

A model of desertion. From a principal-agent theory perspective

Un modelo de deserción. Desde un enfoque teórico de principal-agente

Um modelo de deserção. Desde um enfoque teórico de principal-agente

Palabras clave:

Principal-agent theory, contracts, game theory (en)
teoría de principal-agente, contratos, teoría de juegos (es)
Teoria de principal-agente, contratos, teoria de jogos (pt)

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Autores/as

  • María Del Pilar Castillo Valencia Universidad del Valle
  • Giácomo Balbinotto Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
This article studies the nature of the trade-off between incentives and enforcement mechanisms that an Armed Illegal Organization (AIO)'s leadership, which is the principal, offers to its operatives, who act as agents. This principal-agent model focuses on both the expected benefits and costs for those who decide to stay or defect from the armed organization, in an uncertain context in which desertion is encouraged by an external agent who is providing incentives aimed at fostering operatives' individual desertion. Given a parameterization of the model, we find the optimal transfer system using the constrained minimization routine fmincon in MATLAB's optimizations toolbox. Once we obtain a numerical version of the contract, we use the computational tool to simulate the behavior of agents who are facing the probability of being punished and how this could encourage agents to not make any effort.

Este artículo estudia la naturaleza de la relación inversa entre incentivos y mecanismos de cumplimiento que la cúpula de una organización armada o principal ofrece a sus operativos, quienes actúan como agentes. El modelo de principal-agente se centra tanto en los costos y beneficios esperados de aquellos que deciden permanecer o desertar de la organización armada, en un contexto en el que la deserción es alentada por un agente externo que provee los incentivos para fomentar la deserción individual. Dada una parametrización específica del modelo, un sistema de transferencias óptimo es hallado usando la rutina de minimización con restricciones fmincon de la caja de herramientas de MATLAB. Una vez obtenida esa versión numérica del contrato, se utiliza la herramienta computacional para simular el comportamiento de los agentes que enfrentan la probabilidad de ser castigados y cómo eso podría alentarlos a no hacer ningún tipo de esfuerzo.

Este artigo estuda a natureza da relação inversa entre incentivos e mecanismos de cumprimento que a cúpula de uma organização armada ou principal, oferece a seus operativos, os quais agem como agentes. O modelo de principal-agente se centra tanto nos custos e benefícios esperados daqueles que decidem permanecer ou desertar da organização armada, em um contexto no qual a deserção é estimulada por um agente externo, que dá os incentivos para fomentar a deserção individual. Dada uma parametrização específica do modelo, um sistema de transferências ótimo é achado usando a rotina de minimização com restrições fmincon da caixa de ferramentas de MATLAB. Uma vez obtida essa versão numérica do contrato, é utilizada a ferramenta computacional para simular o comportamento dos agentes que enfrentam a probabilidade de serem punidos e como isso poderia levá-los a não fazer nenhum tipo de esforço.

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