Publicado

2016-07-01

Medición y manipulación de normas sociales en juegos experimentales de corrupción

Measurement and manipulation of social norms in experimental corruption games

Mediçào e manejo de normas sociais em jogos experimentais de corrupçào

Palabras clave:

soborno, conformidad, castigo, coordinación, cooperación, efecto de marco (es)
Bribe, conformity, punishment, coordination, cooperation, framing effect (en)
Suborno, conformidade, puniçào, coordenaçào, cooperaçào, efeito quadro (pt)

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Autores/as

  • Anabel Belaus Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
  • Cecilia Reyna Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
  • Esteban Freidin Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur (IIESS)

Los estudios experimentales de sobornos investigan los factores que modulan los comportamientos vinculados a estas situaciones de corrupción. Para que capten conductas análogas a la realidad, es necesario que representen de manera apropiada las normas sociales que se ven transgredidas cuando hay corrupción. En esta revisión presentamos críticamente tres técnicas para medir o generar normas sociales en experimentos económicos: el efecto de marco, la estimación de normas mediante un juego de coordinación y el castigo de terceros. Discutimos cómo la complementariedad y el mejoramiento de estas técnicas pueden contribuir a la validez externa de los estudios experimentales de corrupción.

Bribery experiments investigate the factors that modulate decisions in corrupt exchanges. To measure behaviours that are representative of decisions in the real world, it is necessary for the social norms that are typically transgressed in corruption to be adequately represented in the experiments. In this review, we critically present three techniques used to measure or generate social norms in economic experiments: Framing effects, the estimation of social norms through a coordination game, and third-party punishment. We discuss ways in which the complementarity and improvement of these techniques can contribute to the external validity of experimental studies on corruption.
Os estudos experimentais de subornos investigam os fatores que modulam os comportamentos vinculados a estas situações de corrupçào. Para captarem condutas análogas à realidade, é necessário que representem, de maneira apropriada, as normas sociais que sào transgredidas quando há corrupçào. Nesta revisào, apresentamos criticamente três técnicas para medir ou gerar normas sociais em experimentos econômicos: o efeito quadro, a estimaçào de normas mediante um jogo de coordenaçào e a puniçào de terceiros. Discutimos como a complementariedade e o aprimoramento destas técnicas podem contribuir para a validade externa dos estudos experimentais de corrupçào.

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