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Secuestro e inversión: un modelo teórico.
Kidnapping and investment: A theoretical model
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/cuad.econ.v43n92.104776Keywords:
Secuestro, Inversion, corrupcion, sobornos, reacción política (es)Kidnapping, Investment, corruption, bribes, political reaction (en)
sequestro, investimento, corrupção, subornos, reação política (pt)
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La actividad delictiva del secuestro afecta negativamente los costos de las empresas. Cuando los secuestradores sobornan a un gobierno corrupto, la reacción política del gobierno para combatir ese crimen dependerá de sopesar el impacto del secuestro sobre la inversión, el excedente del consumidor y el monto del soborno recibido por los secuestradores. Con un alto nivel de corrupción, la reacción política del gobierno para combatir el secuestro dependerá del tamaño del mercado y de la velocidad del proceso de aprendizaje en la lucha contra el secuestro. Con un bajo nivel de corrupción, el gobierno luchará contra el secuestro de manera más regular y efectiva.
Kidnapping, as a criminal activity, negatively affects the costs of firms. In addition, when kidnappers bribe a corrupt government, the government’s political reaction for fighting kidnapping will depend on weighing the impact of kidnapping on investment, consumer surplus and the amount of bribe received by the kidnappers. With a high level of corruption, the government’s political reaction will depend on the size of the market and the speed of the learning process in the fight against kidnapping. With a low level of corruption, the government always fights against kidnapping.
O sequestro, como atividade criminosa, afeta negativamente os custos das empresas. Além disso, quando houver propina dos sequestradores para um governo corrupto, a reação política do governo para combater o sequestro dependerá da ponderação do impacto do sequestro sobre o investimento, o excedente do consumidor e o valor da propina recebida pelos sequestradores. Com um alto nível de corrupção, a reação política do governo para combater o sequestro dependerá do tamanho do mercado e da velocidade do processo de aprendizado no combate ao sequestro. Com baixo índice de corrupção, o governo sempre luta contra o sequestro.
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