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El problema de la conciencia para la filosofía de la mente y de la psiquiatría
The Problem of Consciousness for Philosophy of Mind and of Psychiatry
Palabras clave:
Conciencia, psiquiatría, qualia, subjetividad. (es)Consciousness, psychiatry, qualia, subjectivity. (en)
Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría.
Psychiatrists often encounter patients whose symptoms include disorders or impairments of consciousness. Unfortunately, the meaning of the term consciousness is not altogether clear. This article presents a systematic review of various meanings attributed to this term, as well as of diverse associated philosophical problems. Likewise, it reconstructs some philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness, identifying their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, it offers some suggestions for the use of the term consciousness in psychiatry.
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