Publicado

2019-09-01

The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility

Las concepciones de responsabilidad moral de Strawson y del “libro mayor”

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v68n171.70113

Palabras clave:

Strawson, Zimmerman, moral, reactive attitudes, responsibility (en)
Strawson, Zimmerman, moral, actitudes reactivas, responsabilidad (es)

Autores/as

  • Steefan Cuypers Universidad Católica de Lovaina

This paper returns to the very concept of moral responsibility. Its focus is not on the conditions but on the nature of moral responsibility. First, it introduces the Strawsonian and ledger conceptions of moral responsibility. Next, it contrasts and compares these conceptions. Finally, it evaluates both conceptions and asks which is the right one. Though this article works toward further clarifying the concept of moral responsibility, its conclusion is open-ended.

El artículo vuelve sobre el asunto de la responsabilidad moral y se enfoca no en sus condiciones, sino en la naturaleza de la responsabilidad moral. En primer lugar, introduce las concepciones de Strawson y del “libro mayor” [ledger conception] de la responsabilidad moral. Luego, compara y contrasta esas dos concepciones, Finalmente, evalúa las dos concepciones y se pregunta cuál será la correcta. Aunque el artículo aporta a la aclaración del concepto de responsabilidad moral, su conclusión es abierta.

Referencias

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Fischer, J. M. “Peter Strawson and the Facts of Agency.” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 2. Eds. David. Shoemaker and Neal A. Tognazzini. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 93-116.

Fischer, J. M., and Ravizza, M. Responsibility and Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Fischer, J. M., and Tognazzini, N. A. “The Physiognomy of Responsibility.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2011): 381-417.

Graduale Romano Seraphico, Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, typis Societatis S. Joannis Evangelistae, Desclee & Socii. “Dies Irae.” Missa pro Defunctis. Paris, 1932.

Johansson, J., and Svensson, F. “Objections to Virtue Ethics.” The Oxford Handbook of Virtue. Ed. Nancy E. Snow. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 491-507.

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Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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Mead, G. H. Mind, Self, and Society From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Ed. Charles W. Morris. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Pereboom, D. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 11 For a recent reply to the no moral community (Bill*-type) objection, see McKenna’s (2012 105-10) response to the Robinson Crusoe-type objection.

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Russell, P. “Responsibility, Naturalism, and ‘The Morality System’.” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1. Ed. David Shoemaker. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 184-204.

Strawson, P. F. “Social Morality and Individual Ideal.” Philosophy 36 (1961): 1-17.

Strawson, P. F. “Freedom and Resentment.” Free Will. Ed. Gary Watson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 59-80.

Strawson, P. F. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

Todd, P. “Strawson, Moral Responsibility, and the ‘Order Explanation’: An Intervention.” Ethics 127 (2016): 208-240.

Wallace, R. J. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Watson, G. “Two Faces of Responsibility.” Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 227-248.

Watson, G. “Peter Strawson on Responsibility and Sociality.” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Vol. 2. Eds. David Shoemaker and Neal A. Tognazzini. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 15-32.

Williams, B. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana, 1985.

Zimmerman, M. J. An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988.

Zimmerman, M. J. “Responsibility.” Encyclopedia of Ethics III. Ed. Lawrence C. Becker et al. New York: Garland, 2001. 1486-1492.

Zimmerman, M. J. “Responsibility, Reaction, and Value.” The Journal of Ethics 14 (2010): 103-115.

Zimmerman, M. J. “Varieties of Moral Responsibility.” The Nature of Moral Responsibility. Eds. Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 45-64.

Cómo citar

MODERN-LANGUAGE-ASSOCIATION

Cuypers, S. «The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility». Ideas y Valores, vol. 68, n.º 171, septiembre de 2019, pp. 231-49, doi:10.15446/ideasyvalores.v68n171.70113.

ACM

[1]
Cuypers, S. 2019. The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility. Ideas y Valores. 68, 171 (sep. 2019), 231–249. DOI:https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v68n171.70113.

ACS

(1)
Cuypers, S. The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility. Ideas Valores 2019, 68, 231-249.

APA

Cuypers, S. (2019). The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility. Ideas y Valores, 68(171), 231–249. https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v68n171.70113

ABNT

CUYPERS, S. The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility. Ideas y Valores, [S. l.], v. 68, n. 171, p. 231–249, 2019. DOI: 10.15446/ideasyvalores.v68n171.70113. Disponível em: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/70113. Acesso em: 16 mar. 2026.

Chicago

Cuypers, Steefan. 2019. «The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility». Ideas Y Valores 68 (171):231-49. https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v68n171.70113.

Harvard

Cuypers, S. (2019) «The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility», Ideas y Valores, 68(171), pp. 231–249. doi: 10.15446/ideasyvalores.v68n171.70113.

IEEE

[1]
S. Cuypers, «The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility», Ideas Valores, vol. 68, n.º 171, pp. 231–249, sep. 2019.

Turabian

Cuypers, Steefan. «The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility». Ideas y Valores 68, no. 171 (septiembre 1, 2019): 231–249. Accedido marzo 16, 2026. https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/70113.

Vancouver

1.
Cuypers S. The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility. Ideas Valores [Internet]. 1 de septiembre de 2019 [citado 16 de marzo de 2026];68(171):231-49. Disponible en: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/70113

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1. Maciej Juzaszek. (2021). Philosophical analysis of two types of legal responsibility. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, , p.16. https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.2.16.

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