Publicado

2018-12-15

Experiencia perceptual, vaguedad y realismo ingenuo

Perceptual Experience, Vagueness, and Naive Realism

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v67n4Supl.73374

Palabras clave:

G. Berkeley, D. Hume, percepción, realismo ingenuo, relacionalismo, vaguedad. (es)
G. Berkeley, D. Hume, perception, naive realism, relationalism, vagueness. (en)

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Autores/as

  • Manuel Alejandro Amado Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano / Universidad Central

Filósofos modernos como Berkeley y Hume desplegaron una argumentación de corte escéptico en contra del llamado realismo ingenuo: la idea de que la experiencia perceptual provee un acceso
directo al mundo. Dicha argumentación ha sido criticada por Michael Martin y John Campbell, quienes reclaman justicia por una nueva forma de realismo ingenuo llamado relacionalista. Se argumenta que tanto el realismo ingenuo como el relacionalista son falsos, y se defiende la tesis central de Berkeley y Hume: no hay experiencias perfectamente verídicas de objetos materiales. 

Modern philosophers like Berkeley and Hume deployed skeptical arguments against so-called naive realism: the idea that perceptual experience provides direct access to the world. Michael Martin and John Campbell critique those arguments and champion a new form of naive realism known as relationalism. The article argues that both naive and relational realism are false and defends the main thesis set forth by Berkeley and Hume: there are no perfectly true experiences of material objects.

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Citas

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