Sobre la réplica de Hume a su propia noción del yo
On Hume’s Reply to His Own Account of the Self
Palabras clave:
Hume, Criterio de significación empirista, Contradicción, Nocion del Yo (es)Hume, Empiricist meaning criterion, Contradiction, Personal identity (en)
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In the Treatise of Human Nature Hume presents a critical look at the traditional conception of the Self and offers an idea of it as a collection or bundle of perceptions. Nevertheless, in the Appendix of Treatise, Hume says, in an obscure way, that his own conception of the idea of the Self is problematic. In this paper I shall present the account of the Self as offered by Hume and what Hume says in the Appendix. Then I will examine two possible interpretations of the problem and show the difficulties of each. I finalize this paper by offering my own interpretation based on the other interpretations.
Referencias
Garret, D. “Hume’s Self-Doubts about Personal Identity”. En: The Philosophical Review. Vol. 90. No. 3: 1981, 337-358.
Hume , D. A Treatise of Human Nature. Índice analítico por L. A. Selby-Bigge. Segunda edición con texto revisado y notas por P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Kemp, S. The Philosophy of David Hume. Londres: Macmillan Press, 1941.
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Derechos de autor 2022 Saga – Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía

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