Publicado

2020-07-28

Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?

¿Puede la gestión conjunta de planes de pensiones y fondos de inversión generar un conflicto de interés?

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15446/ede.v30n56.78134

Palabras clave:

pension plans, mutual funds, side-by-side, Jensen’s Alpha, multi-index model, Spanish market. (en)
planes de pensiones, fondos de inversión, alfa de Jensen, gestión conjunta, modelo multi-índice, mercado español. (es)

Autores/as

The purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of mutual funds —pension plans— whose managers simultaneously manage the assets belonging to pension plans —mutual funds— with that achieved by mutual funds —pension plans— whose managers only manage the assets belonging to mutual funds —pension plans—. To do this, we present a sample consisting of data corresponding to 115 Spanish equity pension plans and 336 Spanish equity mutual funds in relation to such aspects as risk-adjusted return, management and custodial fees, asset size, creation date, number of participants, name of the asset management companies for the period between February 2007 and June 2011. On this data, we propose a model using the bootstrap technique. The results obtained show no significant relationship between side-by-side management and financial performance in the mutual fund and pension plan industries. Therefore, we do not find evidence that pension plan investors are being exploited.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es comparar el resultado financiero de los fondos de inversión —planes de pensiones— cuyos gestores manejan simultáneamente el patrimonio perteneciente a planes de pensiones —fondos de inversión— con aquel alcanzado por los fondos de inversión —planes de pensiones— y están especializados en gestionar el patrimonio de un tipo de institución de inversión colectiva. Para ello, se dispone de datos correspondientes a 115 planes de pensiones y 336 fondos de inversión que invierten en renta variable y están domiciliados en España relativos a rentabilidad ajustada al riesgo, comisiones de gestión y depósito, patrimonio, fecha de creación, número de participantes, entidad gestora desde febrero de 2007 hasta junio de 2011. Sobre estos datos se aplica la técnica bootstrap. Los resultados obtenidos indican que no hay una relación significativa entre la gestión conjunta y resultado financiero en las industrias de los fondos de inversión y los planes de pensiones. Por tanto, no se encontró evidencia de que los partícipes de planes de pensiones estén siendo explotados.

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Cómo citar

APA

Martí Ballester, C. P. (2020). Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?. Ensayos de Economía, 30(56), 53–77. https://doi.org/10.15446/ede.v30n56.78134

ACM

[1]
Martí Ballester, C.P. 2020. Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?. Ensayos de Economía. 30, 56 (ene. 2020), 53–77. DOI:https://doi.org/10.15446/ede.v30n56.78134.

ACS

(1)
Martí Ballester, C. P. Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?. Ens. Econ. 2020, 30, 53-77.

ABNT

MARTÍ BALLESTER, C. P. Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?. Ensayos de Economía, [S. l.], v. 30, n. 56, p. 53–77, 2020. DOI: 10.15446/ede.v30n56.78134. Disponível em: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ede/article/view/78134. Acesso em: 20 mar. 2026.

Chicago

Martí Ballester, Carmen Pilar. 2020. «Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?». Ensayos De Economía 30 (56):53-77. https://doi.org/10.15446/ede.v30n56.78134.

Harvard

Martí Ballester, C. P. (2020) «Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?», Ensayos de Economía, 30(56), pp. 53–77. doi: 10.15446/ede.v30n56.78134.

IEEE

[1]
C. P. Martí Ballester, «Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?», Ens. Econ., vol. 30, n.º 56, pp. 53–77, ene. 2020.

MLA

Martí Ballester, C. P. «Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?». Ensayos de Economía, vol. 30, n.º 56, enero de 2020, pp. 53-77, doi:10.15446/ede.v30n56.78134.

Turabian

Martí Ballester, Carmen Pilar. «Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?». Ensayos de Economía 30, no. 56 (enero 1, 2020): 53–77. Accedido marzo 20, 2026. https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ede/article/view/78134.

Vancouver

1.
Martí Ballester CP. Does Concurrent Management of Mutual Funds and Pension Plans Create Conflicts of Interest?. Ens. Econ. [Internet]. 1 de enero de 2020 [citado 20 de marzo de 2026];30(56):53-77. Disponible en: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ede/article/view/78134

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