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Revisitando el desafío de Chakravartty. DEKI y los inobservables en el realismo científico
Revisiting the Chakravartty Challenge. DEKI and the Unobservables in Scientific Realism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v74n189.118198Palabras clave:
leyes, modelos, realismo científico, representación (es)laws, models, representation, Scientific realism (en)
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La concepción semántica de las teorías científicas ha sido propuesta como un marco más favorable que la concepción sintáctica para la defensa del realismo científico. Sin embargo, Chakravartty argumenta que ambas concepciones enfrentan dificultades equivalentes, al articular compromisos realistas con entidades inobservables. Este artículo examina el desafío de Chakravartty mediante el análisis de desarrollos recientes en el debate sobre modelos y representación científica. Aunque reconocemos que la adopción de la concepción semántica no resuelve por sí sola los problemas tradicionales del realismo, sostenemos que la teoría deki (Frigg y Nguyen) ofrece herramientas conceptuales prometedoras para abordar el modelamiento y la representación de inobservables. Nuestro análisis revela que, si bien las teorías de la representación científica son ortogonales a los compromisos ontológicos realistas, los desarrollos modelo-teóricos contemporáneos proporcionan nuevas perspectivas para evaluar la viabilidad del modelamiento de entidades y propiedades inobservables que requiere la defensa del realismo científico.
The semantic view of scientific theories has been proposed as a more favorable framework for scientific realism compared to the syntactic view. However, Chakravartty argues that both views face equivalent difficulties when articulating realist commitments to unobservable entities. This paper examines Chakravartty’s challenge through an analysis of recent developments in the debate on models and scientific representation. While we acknowledge that adopting the semantic view does not resolve traditional realist problems by itself, we argue that the DEKI account (Frigg and Nguyen) offers promising conceptual tools for addressing the modelling and representation of unobservables. Our analysis reveals that, although theories of scientific representation are orthogonal to realist ontological commitments, contemporary model-theoretic developments provide new perspectives for assessing the viability of modeling unobservable entities and properties required by the defense of scientific realism.
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