Patrones reales del yo

Real self-patterns

I argue that Daniel Dennett makes two important contributions to thinking philosophically about the notion of self. First, his narrative conception of the self (self as the “center of narrative gravity”). Second, his concept of ‘real patterns’ which, when applied to the self, forces us to rethink the idea of self as a center of narrative gravity. If we understand the self as a self-pattern, then it is more than a center of narrative gravity. Self-narrative is only one factor in the self-pattern although it plays two important roles: (a) as one among other elements of the self-pattern it contributes to self-constitution; (b) self-narrative reflects all the other significant factors that make up the self-pattern. Accordingly, as Dennett himself suggested, self-narrative “is a much more complicated concept” than an abstract center of gravity.

Sostengo que Daniel Dennett hace dos contribuciones importantes al pensamiento filosófico sobre la noción del yo. Primero, su concepción narrativa del yo (el yo como el “centro de gravedad narrativa”). Segundo, su concepto de “patrones reales” que, cuando se aplica al yo, nos obliga a repensar la idea del yo como centro de gravedad narrativa. El yo es más que un centro de gravedad narrativa; la auto-narración es solo un factor en la constitución del auto-patrón, aunque desempeña dos papeles importantes: (a) como uno entre otros elementos del auto-patrón contribuye a la auto-constitución; (b) la auto-narración refleja todos los demás factores significativos que conforman el auto-patrón. En consecuencia, como el propio Dennett sugirió, la auto-narración “es un concepto mucho más complicado” que un centro de gravedad abstracto.