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2015-09-01

Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge

Palabras clave:


E. J. Craig, knowledge, testimony, value (es)

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Autores/as

  • Leandro De Brasi Universidad Alberto Hurtado
The approach set forth by Edward Craig in Knowledge and the State of Nature has a greater explanatory value than it has been granted to date, and his suitably modified project can resolve a number of puzzling issues regarding the value of knowledge. The paper argues that a novel theory that relates knowledge to testimony is capable of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and why it has a distinctive value. Significantly, this theory avoids the recently advanced revisionism regarding the focus of epistemological research.

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Cómo citar

“Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge”. Ideas Y Valores, vol. 64, no. 159, Sept. 2015, pp. 87-107, https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v64n159.40970.

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Derechos de autor 2015 Autor; Ideas y Valores; Universidad Nacional de Colombia

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