Recursos Naturales de Uso Común: aproximaciones teóricas para su análisis
Common-pool resources: Theoretical approaches for the analysis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/ma.v7.57253Keywords:
bienes comunes, gestión de recursos naturales, acción colectiva, cooperación, control social (es)traditional populations, traditional peoples and communities, conceptual epistemological ambiguities, Amazon (en)
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This article presents a bibliographic review of the main trends of thought that have proposed models for the management of common-pool resources – CPR. It describes three generations of researchers; first, the conservative ideas of Garret Hardin, Mancur Olson and Albert W. Tucker, referring to the application of state regulation and privatization of property rights as the only solutions for the management of common pool resources; second, the liberal proposal of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues, which call for the strengthening of local capacities and self-management, to reach successful models of common pool resources use; and finally, as a research agenda of third generation, the article presents the questioning of Eduardo Araral to the generalization of the policy prescriptions proposed by both currents. The usefulness of these theoretical approaches is visible for regions like the Colombian Amazon, where collective (public and private) property rights prevail, and there is a current debate about the way as common pool resources should be administrated to guarantee the welfare of present and future generations. The analysis of these theoretical approaches is important, because it allows to improve the understanding of the dilemmas faced by local citizens and policy makers. In this sense, the comprehension of these approaches contributes to the regional debate about the models of natural resource management that should be adopted, in order to achieve their sustainable, efficient and equitable use.
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1. Néstor Sanabria, Jesús Cárdenas, Clemencia Martínez. (2022). Gobernanza y estructuración de acuerdos informales y recursos de uso común en el caso de pequeños productores rurales de la Sabana de Bogotá. Ciencia Política, 17(33), p.255. https://doi.org/10.15446/cp.v17n33.93760.
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