"Nunca más tendrán la comodidad de nuestro silencio" Feminismos como resistencia epistémica
Palabras clave:
Feminismos, Injusticia Epistémica, Polifonía, Resistencia (es)Feminisms, Epistemic Injustice, Poliphony, Resistance (en)
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En este artículo pretendo mostrar en qué consiste la propuesta polifónica contextualista de Medina y cómo, siguiendo su interpretación del silenciamiento y la injusticia hermenéutica, la noción de resistencia adquiere una curiosa ambivalencia. Por un lado, encontramos la resistencia en sentido negativo, es decir, la que ejercen los sujetos para no escuchar aquellas voces que pondrán en peligro su posición privilegiada; mientras que, por otro lado, la noción de resistencia parece referirse a las voces marginales que luchan contra el silenciamiento y que señalan las injusticias. En este sentido, sostendré que los feminismos están del lado de las voces disidentes y que, de esta manera, constituyen una forma de resistencia a la injusticia epistémica.
In this article I aim to show what Medina’s polyphonic contextualist proposal consists of and how, following his interpretation of silencing and hermeneutic injustice, the notion of resistance acquires a curious ambivalence. On one hand, we find resistance in a negative sense, namely, that which is exercised by subjects in order to not hear those voices that will put their privileged position at risk; while, on the other hand, the notion of resistance appears to refer to the marginal voices that fight against silencing and that point out injustices. In this sense, I will argue that feminisms are on the side of dissident voices and that, in this way, constitute a form of resistance to epistemic injustice.
Referencias
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