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Origen, usos y utilidad de la distinción personal-subpersonal
Origins, Uses and Usefulness of the Personal-subpersonal Distinction
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v75n190.127259Palabras clave:
Dennett, explicación cognitiva, análisis funcional, distinción doxástica-subdoxástica (es)Dennett, cognitive explanation, functional analysis, doxastic-subdoxastic distinction (en)
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Desde que Dennett introdujo la distinción personal-subpersonal en Content and Consciousness, esta se ha utilizado en diversas disciplinas. Aunque hay consenso en que la distinción se ubica principalmente en el nivel explicativo, algunos filósofos la han empleando como una distinción ontológica para referirse a estados y procesos, lo cual algunos consideran un abuso que genera confusión, incluso asimilándola a la distinción doxástica-subdoxástica. En este trabajo, primero clarificaré la distinción, mostrando que Dennett la ha defendido como una idea similar. Luego, argumentaré que algunos intentos de aclararla no solo fracasan en iluminarla sino que también la oscurecen, al definir usos correctos e incorrectos y omitir la pluralidad de fenómenos para los que fue propuesta. Finalmente, ofreceré generalizaciones sobre los fenómenos típicos para los cuales fue formulada, ilustrando su utilidad mediante un ejemplo que revela la fragilidad de un argumento filosófico.
Since Dennett introduced the personal-subpersonal distinction in Content and Consciousness, it has been used across various disciplines. Although there is consensus that the distinction is primarily situated at the explanatory level, some philosophers have employed it as an ontological distinction to refer to states and processes, which some consider a misuse that leads to confusion, even equating it with the doxastic-subdoxastic distinction. In this paper, I will first clarify the distinction, showing that Dennett has defended it as a similar idea. Next, I will argue that some attempts to clarify it not only fail to illuminate it but also obscure it, by defining correct and incorrect uses and omitting the plurality of phenomena for which it was proposed. Finally, I will offer generalizations about the typical phenomena for which it was formulated, illustrating its usefulness through an example that reveals the fragility of a philosophical argument.
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