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2009-09-01

On The Viability Of Semi-Compatibilism

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Semi-compatibilism, moral responsibility, alternative possibilities, choice, normative principles (es)

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  • Ishtiyaque Haji
Semi-compatibilism regarding responsibility is the position according to which determinism is compatible with moral responsibility quite apart from whether determinism rules out the sort of freedom that involves access to alternative possibilities. I motivate the view that whether or not semi-compatiblism is viable turns on whether various prima facieattractive normative principles are true or false. I introduce a subset of these principles. I then map out some positions regarding the tenability of semi-compatibilism depending upon which of these principles, if any, is true. I conclude that for many, the price of maintaining semi-compatibilism may be too steep because maintaining semi-compatibilism requires abandoning one or more of the principles in this subset.

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“On The Viability Of Semi-Compatibilism”. Ideas Y Valores, vol. 58, no. 141, Sept. 2009, pp. 125-40, https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/36257.

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