Publicado

2012-01-01

THE MYTH OF CONCEPT PUBLICITY

Palabras clave:


G. Frege, concepts, concept individuation, publicity constraint (es)

Descargas

Autores/as

  • Laura Duhau Girola
In this paper I defend the claim that concepts are not public. I argue that two of the main constraints for theories of concepts, namely (1) that concepts are public and (2) that they serve to explain Frege Cases, are in tension. (1) requires concepts to be individuated coarsely, while (2) requires concepts to be individuated finely. Thus, no theory of concepts can accommodate both (1) and (2). I argue that (2) is a non-negotiable constraint for theories of concepts, while (1) is negotiable. Therefore, theories of concepts should individuate concepts finely enough to solve Frege Cases, and claim that concepts are not public. 

Referencias

Clark, A. and Prinz, J. "Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twentyfirst Century", Mind and Language 19/1 (2004): 57-69.

Fodor, J. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Fodor, J. and Lepore, E. Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992.

Glock, H. "Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes Wrong", Philosophy 84/1 (2009): 5-29.

Lalumera, E. "Are Concepts Public?" Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society, Bara, B.G., Barsalou, L. and Bucciarelli, M. (eds.). Hillsdale, NJ: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, 2005. 1231-1235.

Laurence, S. and Margolis, E. "The Ontology of Concepts -Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?", Noûs 41/4 (2007): 561-593.

Peacocke, C. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.

Prinz, J. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.

Rey, G. "Concepts and Stereotypes", Cognition 15 (1983): 237-262.

Schiffer, S. "Belief Adscription", Journal of Philosophy 89/10 (1992): 499-521.

Schroeder, T. "A Recipe for Concept Similarity", Mind and Language 22/1 (2007): 68-91.

Segal, G. A Slim Book About Narrow Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.

Sutton, J. "Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68/1(2004): 89-108.

Cómo citar

“THE MYTH OF CONCEPT PUBLICITY”. Ideas Y Valores, vol. 61, no. 148, Jan. 2012, pp. 101-13, https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/36798.

Licencia

Derechos de autor 2016 Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.

De acuerdo con la Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-No Comercial-SinDerivar 4.0 Internacional. Se autoriza copiar, redistribuir el material en cualquier medio o formato, siempre y cuando se conceda el crédito a los autores de los textos y a Ideas y Valores como fuente de publicación original. No se permite el uso comercial de copia o distribución de contenidos, así como tampoco la adaptación, derivación o transformación alguna de estos sin la autorización previa de los autores y de la dirección de Ideas y Valores. Para mayor información sobre los términos de esta licencia puede consultar: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.