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Influencia del conflicto de agencia en el desempeño financiero: la experiencia de un país emergente
The Influence Of Agency Conflict On Financial Performance: The Case Of An Emerging Country
Influência do conflito de agência no desempenho financeiro: a experiência de um país emergente
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/innovar.v34n93.99630Palabras clave:
administración independiente, administración propietaria, conflicto de agencia, desempeño financiero, razones financieras (es)Independent management, owner management, agency conflict, financial performance, financial ratios (en)
administração independente, administração proprietária, conflito de agência, desempenho financeiro, índices financeiros (pt)
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Separar la administración y la propiedad es una problemática que toda empresa enfrenta, en especial durante sus etapas iniciales de crecimiento. Las alternativas de administración independiente o propietaria representan riesgos y beneficios, sobre todo cuando los intereses del agente y la organización se contraponen, situación conocida como “conflicto de agencia”. El estudio tiene como objetivo determinar la influencia del conflicto de agencia en el desempeño financiero. Para esto, se estudia a las empresas ecuatorianas del sector textil, durante el período 2014-2018. Mediante análisis descriptivo y comparativo se establecen las principales características de la gestión financiera de las em-presas con administración independiente y administración propietaria. Se estima un modelo de regresión que analiza el efecto del conflicto de agencia en el desempeño empresarial. Los hallazgos indican que el conflicto de agencia tiene un impacto negativo sobre el desempeño organizacional; sin embargo, esta relación varía según el tamaño de las firmas. De esta manera, a mayor tamaño, el conflicto de agencia tiene un efecto positivo sobre el desempeño empresarial; además, la liquidez, el endeudamiento, la presencia del conflicto de agencia y su interacción con el tamaño empresarial son predictores del desempeño financiero.
The separation of management and ownership is a challenge faced by many companies, especially during their initial stages of growth. The alternatives of independent or owner management pose risks and benefits, particularly when the interests of the agent and the organization are at odds, a situation known as “agency conflict.” Within this context, the present study aims to determine the influence of agency conflict on the financial performance of Ecuadorian companies in the textile sector during the period 2014-2018. Through descriptive and comparative analysis, we establish the main characteristics of the financial management of independently managed companies and those under an owner-management approach. A regression model is estimated in order to analyze the effect of agency conflict on business performance. Findings indicate that agency conflict has a negative impact on organizational performance. However, this relationship varies according to firm size. Hence, larger firms experience a positive effect of agency conflict on business performance, while in small firms is the opposite. Furthermore, liquidity, indebtedness, the presence of agency conflict, and its interaction with firm size are identified as predictors of financial performance.
Separar a administração da propriedade é uma questão que toda empresa enfrenta, especialmente durante os estágios iniciais de crescimento. As alternativas de administração independente ou proprietária representam riscos e benefícios, especialmente quando os interesses do agente e da organização entram em conflito, uma situação conhecida como “conflito de agência”. Nesse contexto, o objetivo deste estudo é determinar a influência do conflito de agência no desempenho financeiro. Para isso, são estudadas empresas equatorianas do setor têxtil durante o período de 2014 a 2018. Por meio de análise descritiva e comparativa, são estabelecidas as principais características da gestão financeira de empresas com administração independente e proprietária. Um modelo de regressão é estimado para analisar o efeito do conflito de agência no desempenho empresarial. Os resultados indicam que o conflito de agência tem um impacto negativo sobre o desempenho organizacional; contudo, essa relação varia de acordo com o tamanho da empresa. Assim, quanto maior o tamanho da empresa, mais o conflito de agência tem um efeito positivo sobre o desempenho da empresa; além disso, a liquidez, o endividamento, a presença de conflito de agência e sua interação com o tamanho da empresa são preditores do desempenho financeiro.
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