Relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño en empresas colombianas
Relationship between corporate governance, family control and financial performance in colombian companies
Relação entre governança corporativa, controle familiar e desempenho em empresas colombianas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/innovar.v28n69.71698Palabras clave:
desempeño financiero, empresa familiar, endogeneidad, gmm, gobierno corpo¬rativo, junta directiva (es)Financial performance, family business, endogeneity, gmm, corporate governance, board of directors (en)
conselho diretor, desempenho financeiro, empresa familiar, endogeneidade, Generalized Method of Moments, governança corporativa (pt)
El gobierno corporativo como herramienta para minimizar los problemas de agencia parece tener un efecto positivo en el desempeño. Este trabajo analiza la relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño financiero en empresas colombianas. A través del método generalizado de momentos (GMM), se estimó dicha relación en un panel de datos balanceado para 104 empresas inscritas en el Registro Nacional de Valores y Emisores (RNVE) durante el periodo 2008-2014. Las empresas fueron clasificadas como empresa familiar (EF), cuando se identificó una familia como accionista controlante mayoritario. El desempeño fue aproximado a partir de la rentabilidad del activo (ROA) y la rentabilidad del patrimonio (ROE). Para medir el nivel de gobierno corporativo se usaron las 41 prácticas recomendadas en el Código País. Se encontró que solo las prácticas alusivas a la junta directiva se relacionan con el roa, mientras que en el caso del roe no se encontró evidencia de relación con alguna de las prácticas de gobierno corporativo. Respecto al carácter familiar, se encontró que, cuando una familia es el primer accionista controlante, las empresas presentan mayor desempeño. No obstante, cuando los dos primeros accionistas controlantes son familias, se observó que no existe relación con el desempeño
Corporate governance seems to have a positive effect on business performance as a tool to minimize agency problems. This paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, family control and financial performance in Colombian companies. Through the generalized method of moments (GMM), this relationship was estimated in a balanced data panel for 104 companies registered in the National Registry of Securities and Issuers (RNVE, in Spanish) during the 2008-2014 period. Analyzed companies were classified as a family business (FB) when a family was identified as majority controlling shareholder. Performance was measured by the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE). The 41 practices recommended in the Country Code were used in order to measure the corporate governance level. It was found that only those practices referring to the board of directors are related to roa, while in the case of the roe no evidence of any of the corporate governance practices was found. Regarding the family character, it was found that when a family is the first controlling shareholder companies show a higher performance. However, no relationship with performance was observed when the first two controlling shareholders are families.
A governança corporativa como ferramenta para atenuar os problemas de agência parece ter efeito positivo no desempenho. Este trabalho analisa a relação entre governança corporativa, controle familiar e desempenho financeiro em empresas colombianas. Por meio do método generalizado dos momentos, essa relação foi estimada em dados em painel balanceado para 104 empresas cadastradas no Registro Nacional de Valores e Emissores entre 2008 e 2014. As empresas foram classificadas como empresa familiar, quando foi identificada uma família como acionista controlador predominante. O desempenho foi aproximado a partir da rentabilidade do ativo (ROA) e da rentabilidade do patrimônio (ROE). Para medir o nível de governança corporativa, foram usadas as 41 práticas recomendadas no Código País. Constatou-se que somente as práticas alusivas ao conselho diretor se relacionam com o roa, enquanto, no caso do roe, não foi encontrada prova de relação com alguma das práticas de governança corporativa. A respeito do caráter familiar, constatou-se que, quando uma família é o primeiro acionista controlador, as empresas apresentam maior desempenho. Contudo, quando os dois primeiros acionistas controladores são famílias, observou-se que não existe relação com o desempenho.
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